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LORD OF THE LIENS: TOWARDS GREATER
EFFICIENCY IN SECURED SYNDICATED LENDING
William H. Widen*
INTRODUCTION
Three liens for the syndicated loans, seven for the equipment
financier in Stamford, nine for the general unsecured creditors who
play ball, and one financing statement to rule them all, and in the
darkness bind them.
Recent amendments to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
greatly simplified the process of creating a secured credit transaction.,
Despite these positive developments, we find both the rise of insurance
products to compete with security interest legal opinions2 and the
decrease in importance placed on legal opinions by rating agencies. 3
Meanwhile, lawyers continue to refine security interest legal opinion
practices. 4 The premise of this article is that a significant reason for
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law; wwiden@law.miami.edu.
Professor Widen practiced corporate and commercial law at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New
York City from 1984 to 2001, where he was a partner from 1991. This article benefited from a
legal theory workshop held at University of Miami School of Law in October 2003 and from
additional comments from, and discussions with, Caroline Bradley, David Carlson, Mary
Coombs, Michael Froomkin, Patrick Gudridge, Frances Hill, Elliott Manning, Robert Rosen and
George Triantis.
I Most jurisdictions adopted a version of revised Article 9 effective July 1, 2001. Unless
otherwise indicated, references to Revised Article 9 (Secured Transactions) are to the version
promulgated by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as amended and modified
through 2001.
2 For example, the First American family of companies offers the "Eagle 9" policy in
California, see "Eagle 9," at http://www.eagle9.com/downloads/calucc.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2004), and the Fidelity National Financial family of companies offers the "UCCplus" policy, see
"Welcome to UCCPIus," at http://www.uccplus.com/index.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); see
also Sandra Stern, An Analysis of The Secured Lender's UCC Article 9 Insurance Policy, (noting
that UCC insurance expands business for traditional real estate title insurance companies), at
http://www.uccplus.com/files/uccanalysis.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
3 See Dina Moskowitz, RevisedArticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: New Standard &
Poor's Criteria, STANDARD & POOR'S, June 1, 2001.
4 See Special Report of the Tribar Opinion Committee, U. C. C. Security Interest Opinions,
Revised Article 9, 58 Bus. LAW. 1449 (2003).
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these trends is the increasing complexity of secured credit transactions,
particularly in large syndicated loans. 5 The recent amendments to
Article 9 provide valuable, but only limited, assistance in managing this
complexity. Both law reform and contracting techniques have not kept
up with the complexity. The rise of insurance and the trend towards
legal opinion abandonment are symptoms of the complexity, but not
real solutions to manage it.6
The goal of this article is to propose a business practice for
managing this complexity called the "Lord of the Liens" or "LOTL"
structure. The project amounts to an exercise in transaction cost
engineering. 7 The approach is to develop a template for debtors to
create a reusable transaction infrastructure for executing secured credit
transactions that operates within the framework of existing law. It
involves a reassessment of the extent to which security interests can
operate as permanent features of a debtor's or borrowing group's
organizational structure, much as subsidiary companies function in a
corporate group. It challenges the notion that current law reflects a
fundamental distinction between legal entities and other asset
partitioning devices, such as security interests. 8 The article identifies
possible changes in law that would enhance the transaction cost
engineering project.
5 This claim should not be understood as simply an observation that the complexity of
business organizations recently has increased. Complicated business organizational structures
have been with us for a long time. See, e.g., FRANK CLARKE ET AL., CORPORATE COLLAPSE (2d
ed. 2003) (describing the failures of large business organizations during the last century).
6 The security interest insurance policy is a mechanism for transferring certain transaction
responsibilities from the deal lawyer to the insurance company. See Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance,
and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in EMBRACING RISK, THE CHANGING CULTURE OF
INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 38 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, eds., 2002). It is unlikely
that material risk will be borne by companies that merely perform lien search services. See Puget
Sound Fin., L.L.C. v. Unisearch, Inc., 47 P.3d 940 (Wash. 2002) (upholding contractual
limitation on liability of UCC filing search firm to search fee when secured creditor suffered
significant loss from failure to have a priority position). A law firm may have strict liability for
failure to file a financing statement. See Lory v. Parsoff, 745 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 2002)
(finding malpractice per se).
7 Ronald Gilson proposed that we analyze the role of lawyer as that of a transaction cost
engineer. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 253 (1984). At that time, his approach was viewed as novel. See
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 397 (1985). The LOTL
project views the evolution of syndicated lending as a device to manage transaction costs in the
spirit of Ronald Coase, who suggested that the existence of firms be explained as a device to
reduce transaction costs. See generally RONALD N. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAW (1988). The fundamental problem posed by secured syndicated lending is that this process
of cost reduction by ever increasing sophisticated contracting procedures must evolve techniques
for efficiently complying with the property law tasks required to complete a secured transaction
or the evolution will stop, absent changes in positive law.
8 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000) [hereinafter Organizational Law] (offering the view that organizational law
operates as a superior device for partitioning assets, both to benefit certain creditor classes and to
protect owners from liabilities). For a further discussion, see infra Part Ii.
SECURED SYNDICATED LENDING
The cornerstone of the strategy requires that a debtor designate a
single trustworthy third party (i) to act as the nominee for all its secured
lenders, both in public filings and in certain other security
documentation and (ii) to maintain copies of filings and other
documents relating to a debtor's voluntary secured credit transactions
and of lien searches. This third party is our "lien lord" who will tell the
truth to potential new lenders about the secured credit status of the
debtor. Efficiency is enhanced because creditors share the same
searches, filings and monitoring information maintained with the
nominee, thus reducing steps taken to close individual secured
financings. Opportunities exist for creditors to share security
documents, thus further reducing contracting costs. Importantly,
reducing the number of steps taken to complete a secured credit
transaction should significantly reduce the risk of error as well as
lowering direct transaction costs. The LOTL structure also allows
debtors to create alternative priority orderings. Considering such a
structure has value because, in the near term, it may provide practical
benefit to debtors and creditors and, in the long term, it may inform the
direction that future amendments to Article 9 and other security interest
legal regimes should take.
The complexity of modern secured credit transactions arises from
three sources. First, Article 9 provides only a partial system for
perfecting security interests in personal property. Other laws provide
systems for perfecting security interests excluded from Article 9's
scope. 9 Further, Article 9 does not cover security interests in real estate,
other than fixtures. 10 Complexity arises because a creditor must comply
both with Article 9 and these other legal regimes to perfect a security
interest in all assets of a debtor. Second, Article 9 contains perfection
hierarchies that permit creditors to use alternate methods to perfect a
security interest in certain asset types. 1' Third, complexity arises
because, in many cases, the real "debtor" is not a single legal entity but
instead is a "borrowing group" consisting of multiple legal entities that
are members of a consolidated family of companies. Further, the
"creditor" often is not a single lender but, instead, is a syndicate of
lenders that desires a blanket lien on all assets of the borrowing group.
In contrast, the paradigmatic transaction against which Article 9 and
other secured credit legal regimes are framed consists of a single debtor
and a single creditor, often with a single asset or asset class serving as
9 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 28, 30 (2000) (copyrights); 49 U.S.C. § 44107 (2000) (aircraft); 49
U.S.C. § 20(c) (2000) (railroads).
10 See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11) (2001).
11 See Randall C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Ivontemporal Priority Rules, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1157, 1158 (1999) (suggesting that perfection hierarchies may be efficient in
matching creditors to collateral on which they are relying).
2004] 1579
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
collateral. Because Article 9 and these other systems were structured
primarily to process simple bilateral transactions between individual
legal entities, they do not handle complicated business structures well.
All three types of complexity cause problems in similar ways.
First, the searching function is complicated. A creditor must search
multiple information sources based on asset type to determine the
overall secured credit status of a debtor. If a perfection method (other
than filing in a public record) produces priority over a security interest
perfected by prior filing in a public record, further inquiry is necessary.
The problem is compounded in the case of borrowing groups because
the public records for multiple legal entities must be searched. Second,
the perfection function is complicated because the creditor must
perform multiple ceremonies to obtain a perfected security interest in all
assets of a debtor. Again, a borrowing group aggravates the situation.
Third, the current system creates complexity for the creditor because
monitoring the continuing perfection of a security interest must be done
across multiple asset types and, in the case of a borrowing group, across
multiple legal entities.
Rather than focusing on small, simple transactions and attempting
to draw system wide conclusions about the complexity and efficiency of
secured credit, the methodology used here instead concentrates on
complex transactions and considers how those transactions stress the
secured credit system. 12 Thus, the focus is on large secured commercial
loans, rather than on secured consumer finance. 13 Economists often
measure the efficiency of a system by measuring the steps it takes to
accomplish some goal.' 4 Currently, borrowers and lenders take many
12 A similar approach is used to evaluate efficiency of algorithms in which programmers are
interested in how large, rather than small, sets of data are processed. See THOMAS H. KORMAN
ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 23 (17th ed. 1996).
13 Some insurance companies are recommending UCC insurance for any lender secured by a
material amount of tangible or intangible personal property. See S. H. Spencer Compton,
Commercial Applications of the New UCC Insurance Policy, available at
http://www.faticony.com/pages/legalpages/Isldoc.ganjo?documentld=237 (last visited Feb. 26,
2004). By way of example, the premium payable for a U.C.C Policy in New York would be
S 13,000 for a policy of $20 million, $28,000 for a policy of $50 million and $50,500 for a policy
of $100 million. See Michael J. Berey, Title Insurance for Mezzanine Loan Financing in New
York (2001 ), available at
http://www.faticony.com/pages/legalpages/ls-doc.ganjo?documentld-236 (last visited Feb. 26,
2004).
14 See, e.g., DARON ACEMOGLU & SIMON JOHNSON, UNBUNDLING INSTITUTIONS (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9934, 2003) (discussing relative efficiencies of
common law and civil law jurisdictions as they relate to contract law and property law
institutions); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) (discussing inefficiencies
in real property recording systems as an obstacle to economic growth in Third World countries);
World Bank Study (relating to contract enforcement and efficiency), at
http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/Methodology/ContractEnforcement.aspx (last visited
Feb. 26, 2004). In all these studies, steps required to achieve some goal are counted, with more
steps being a proxy for lowered efficiency. The procedure of counting "steps" is an imprecise
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steps to complete a secured credit transaction. Efficiency in secured
lending would be enhanced if the number of steps taken to close an
individual secured loan could be reduced. These steps may be reduced
by creation of "transaction infrastructure" in the form presented in this
article.
Before considering the LOTL structure in detail, Part I of the
article considers how the syndicated loan market currently uses
contracting techniques to reduce steps taken in loan transactions. Part II
of the article describes how to implement the LOTL structure within
current law and secured lending practices, indicating obstacles where
they exist. Part Ill of the article discusses possible objections to use of
the LOTL structure. Part IV of the article explores how the LOTL
structure might be used to address certain big picture criticisms leveled
against the current system of secured credit by academic observers.
Part V of the article concludes with an appeal for a second look at use of
security interests as asset partitioning devices. It identifies the
parameters of favorable property law rules that allow transaction cost
engineers to make further progress toward managing the challenges
posed by increasing transaction complexity.
1. WHAT HAPPENS Now
In a typical large secured credit transaction, an individual creditor
does not lend to an individual borrower. Instead, numerous lenders,
represented by one or a small number of agents, form a syndicate. The
agent likely arranges the syndicate at the request of a borrower to raise a
specified sum. The agent negotiates the terms of the credit agreement
with the borrower for the syndicate. Neither is the borrower likely to be
a single legal entity. Rather, the borrower is a group of companies that
reports financial results on a consolidated basis.' 5 The segment of the
method insofar as one needs to specify individuation criteria for steps before one can begin
counting. Similarly, such an approach might treat multiple simple steps as more complex than
completion of a single, difficult step that, in fact, involved more cost. Nevertheless, with these
limitations in mind, counting steps does offer a measurable definition of efficiency. A similar
simplifying assumption is made when programmers measure running time of an algorithm by
assuming that each line of code requires a constant amount of time to execute. See KORMAN ET
AL., supra note 12, at 7. Comparable individuation problems arise when, in tax law, lawyers
must decide whether there is a single integrated transaction or numerous smaller transactions.
See, e.g., Charles I. Kingson, The Confusion Over Tax Ownership, 93 TAx NOTES 409 (2001)
(discussing form and substance in tax shelter transactions).
15 A recent count of the top twenty-five companies in the Fortune 500 list that are users of
subsidiaries in tax haven jurisdictions reveals an average of approximately 660 total subsidiaries
(of which an average of approximately fifty-seven were formed in tax havens). This reflects an
increase from the 1997 average of approximately 310 total subsidiaries (of which an average of
approximately sixteen were formed in tax havens). See Citizen Works, 25 Fortune 500
Corporations with the Most Offshore Tax-Haven Subsidiaries, at http://www.citizenworks.org/
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syndicated loan market in which security interests are most likely to be
used is the non-investment grade borrower market. 16 This is the
environment for which application of the LOTL structure is designed.
A common explanation for the syndication process is that, when
sums get large, individual lenders lack the funds necessary to supply all
the credit needs of a borrower or do not want to supply those funds
because of a desire to diversify investments. The lenders, thus, must
band together so that collectively the sums required by the borrower
may be advanced.17 Another explanation for the syndication process
relates to efficiencies created by agent signaling. If an agent holds a
significant portion of the syndicated loan, other potential syndicate
members view the large retained position in the loan as a signal that the
credit represents a good loan investment. Based on this signal,
syndicate members participate in the loan after conducting more limited
due diligence than they would conduct in the absence of the signal. In
effect, the participants join syndicates based on the brand name of the
agent, thus saving them costs.' 8 These explanations tell only part of the
eorp/tax/top25.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). A broader but more dated survey of the top 1,000
American companies reveals approximately fifty subsidiaries per corporate group. See PHILLIP
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 2.02.1, at 28-9, Tables 5, 6, 7, at 465-70 (1983).
The widespread use of subsidiaries in corporate groups adds significant transaction complexity to
secured syndicated lending.
16 By one measure, new syndications of loans in the United States totaled $979.6 billion in
2003, of which $368.3 were leveraged loans to non-investment grade credits. See Thomson
Financial, Syndicated Loans Selected 2003 League Tables (2004), available at
http://www.thomson.com/cms/assets/pdfs/financial/league-table/syndicated-loans/4Q2003/press
_releases/4Q03 Global SLSelectedRankings.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). The figures for
2002 are comparable. Id. New syndications of non-investment grade loans totaled approximately
$320 billion in 2000, representing about one-fourth of the $1.2 trillion in new syndications that
year. See Jathon Sapsford, As Loan Defaults Rise, Banks Shift Some Risk to Individual Investors,
WALL ST. J., July 23, 2001, at Al; see also Loan Pricing Corporation, U.S. Lead Arranger
League Tables 2003 (1-4Q03) (2004) (providing additional league table information on size of
U.S. syndicated loan market in 2002-03), available at http://www.loanpricing.com/analytics/
league table_us.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
17 The size of loans made by individual lenders may be limited for a variety of reasons,
including regulatory limits on the permitted size of credit exposure to individual borrowers and
asset diversification preferences dictated by portfolio risk management strategies. See, e.g.,
Steven A. Dennis & Donald J. Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 404
(2000). There is some evidence that diversification has not, in fact, led to higher profits at banks.
See Viral V. Acharya et al., Should Banks Be Diversified? Evidence from IndividualBank Loan
Portfolios (BIS, Working Xaper No. 118, 2002), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/work 18.pdf (Udst visited Feb. 26, 2004).
18 Interestingly, in syndicated loan documentation, the agent expressly disclaims
responsibility for information about the borrower. The syndicate members confirm in writing that
they are relying on their own investigation of the borrower. Typically, this investigation consists
of reviewing a bank disclosure book prepared by the borrower, with the help of the agent,
describing the loan and the borrower. The notion that a lead bank has special access to
information about a borrower has led to the phenomenon that a company's stock prices rise when
it announces a new credit facility. In effect, the securities markets take a free ride on monitoring
provided by banks. See D. Besanko & G. Kanatas, Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank
2004] SECURED SYNDICATED LENDING 1583
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Syndication is also a technique for minimizing the direct
transaction costs associated with the contracting process. Instead of a
borrower separately negotiating with multiple lenders for the funds
needed in its specific operations, multiple negotiations at the borrower
level are replaced by a single negotiation for the benefit of the borrower,
with the agent acting for the syndicate. 19  The details of these
contracting efficiencies is important. We must consider both how a set
of individual debtors becomes a borrowing group and how a set of
individual lenders becomes a syndicate.
A. Of Borrowing Groups
The concept of a "borrowing group" is important to understand.20
A paradigmatic corporate structure starts with a top-tier holding
company owned by multiple investors. 21 In turn, this top-tier holding
company owns 100 percent of a second holding company. This second
holding company owns multiple subsidiaries. The lending syndicate
makes loans to the second holding company as the "primary debtor. '22
Monitoring and Moral Hazard, 31 J. FIN. 215 (1993).
19 Some companies use multiple bilateral credit agreements. Such use results in criticism
from rating agencies. See Global Credit Research, Rating Methodology: Assessing the Strength
of a Liquidity Facility, MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., June 1999. The syndicated lending market
further discourages use of bilateral credit agreements by withholding league table credit from
bilateral loan transactions. See Thomson Financial, Syndicated Loans Global League Table
Criteria Third Quarter 2003, available at
http://www.thomson.com/cms/assets/pdfs/financia/league-table/syndicated- loans/3Q2003/3Q03
SL Criteria.PDF (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). Some financial models explain how bilateral
lending may be more efficient for borrowers who place a premium on protecting proprietary
information. See S. Bhattacharya & G. Chiesa, Proprietary Information, Financial
Intermediation and Research Incentives, 4 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 328 (1995); see also Jim
Armstrong, The Syndicated Loan Market: Developments in the North American Context, Bank of
Canada Working Paper No. 2003-15 (2003) (describing shift from bilateral to multilateral
contracting), available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/publications/working.papers/2003/wpO3-
15.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
20 It is beyond the scope of this article to explore why business organizations form as a
consolidated group of separate legal entities under common ownership. This, however, is a topic
of research. See PHILLIP 1. BLUMBERG, THE MULTNATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION
LAW 52-61 (1993) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE] (discussing the
emergence of corporate groups); George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets:
The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable
Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV 1102 (2004); Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106
YALE L.J. 1 (1996) (discussing how easy formation of legal entities can result in a world in which
liability for action is reduced to a minimum).
21 The top tier company might be either a publicly traded company, a privately held company
owned by investors in a leveraged buyout fund or another type of private company.
22 It is clear that when a borrowing group designates a single primary debtor to borrow for the
group the group is centralizing the financial decision making function. In essence, an internal
capital allocation scheme is created within the organization to allocate funding received from a
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The top tier holding company provides a downstream guarantee of the
loans. The subsidiaries provide upstream guarantees of the loans. The
primary debtor borrows money from the syndicate and transfers the loan
proceeds to those members of the consolidated group that need funds.
Typically, the primary debtor transfers funds to other legal entities in
the group by making inter-company advances or loans, though
sometimes transfers may be made as capital contributions. This system
of guarantees 23 and advances breaks down the boundaries of limited
liability created by the myriad legal entities in a consolidated group of
companies and creates a single economic unit. In a secured financing,
each member of the borrowing group (other than the borrower) grants a
security interest in its assets to secure repayment of its guarantee. The
borrower grants a security interest in its assets to secure directly
repayment of the loans.
In substance, the lending syndicate sees itself as making loans to
the borrowing group rather than to individual legal entities. Ideally, this
synthetically created "group borrower" is co-extensive with all the legal
entities whose results are reported in the consolidated financial
statements of the top tier holding company.24
A guarantee structure, such as that described above, is a form of
transaction engineering but does not constitute "transaction
infrastructure" in the sense intended here. Other than in the case of
keepwell or net-worth maintenance arrangements typically provided by
a parent company to an individual financing subsidiary, a borrowing
group puts a guarantee web structure in place on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. When the guarantee web is supported by collateral
the borrowing group similarly puts in place the security agreements,
security interest filings, legal opinions and related matters on a
transaction-by-transaction basis. Because consolidated companies
typically recreate a guarantee web for each transaction, they do not rely
on "transaction infrastructure" as envisioned by this article.
Beyond documenting the guarantee web, three legal problems
plague the structure: (i) the first, a preferential transfer problem, was
arguably addressed by an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code;25 (ii) the
single external source. The primary borrower allocates funds to group members rather than an
external capital market. See Triantis, supra note 20. At some point, the internal monitoring costs
of allocating capital will increase to such an extent that the size of the firm is limited. Cf V.
Cerasi & S. Daltung, The Optimal Size of a Bank: Costs and Benefits of Diversification, 44 EUR.
ECON. REV. 1701 (2000) (explaining how internal management costs at a bank increase and thus
limit the size to which a bank will grow).
23 The guarantees are structured as guarantees of payment, rather than guarantees of
collection.
24 The ideal match typically does not occur if foreign subsidiaries are held in the borrowing
group because a primary debtor does not let its foreign subsidiaries provide guarantees lest
adverse tax consequences flow from the guarantee. See note 27 infra.
25 See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (the "Deprizio"
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second, a fraudulent transfer problem, is addressed by contract
provisions that recite the burdens and benefits of the guarantee, 26 but
otherwise ignored; and, (iii) the third, a tax problem, remains open.27
In certain other areas of law, reporting responsibility and liability
take a functional, group approach, rather than being limited by
boundaries set by the legal entity.28 The laws affecting secured lending,
however, do not yet allow for this functional approach. The existing
legal apparatus requires that each legal entity be dealt with separately
when collateral is provided. However, procedures that appear efficient
for a single debtor entity appear less efficient when the relevant
"borrower" actually is a family of companies. Legal entity boundaries
still matter in secured lending, but it might be a more efficient world if
they did not matter to the same extent.29 One method to manage this
transaction complexity would be for borrowing groups to invest in
permanent transaction infrastructure that reduces the steps that are
needed to implement a typical secured loan to a borrowing group as
discussed in Part II of this article.
B. OfLending Syndicates
Bank lending has evolved from single lender loans to syndicated
credit facilities. 30 Today, the syndicated loan market is one of the
case). The problems caused by the Deprizio case were the focus of a statutory amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code and appear at II U.S.C. § 550(c). See Steve H. Nicklcs, Deprizio Dead Yet?
Birth, Wounding, And Another Attempt To Kill The Case, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251 (2001);
David Gray Carlson, Avoidance Theory According to Steve Nickles, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1277,
1279 (2001) (explaining that, under Professor Nickles' theory, the Deprizio case remains alive
because the statutory "fix" passed by Congress was inadequate).
26 See Peter Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial
Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REV. 655 (1983); Phillip I. Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-
Stream, and Downstream) Guaranties Under The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO
L. REV. 685, 689 n.14 (1987) (collecting citations to articles); William H. Coquillette, Guaranty
of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 433 (1980).
27 Because of the operation of § 956 of the Internal Revenue Code, foreign subsidiaries do not
provide upstream guarantees of the loans because the provision of such guarantees operate as
deemed dividends to the United States parent company on which tax must be paid. Instead, two-
thirds of the foreign subsidiary's stock is pledged by its owner as security to support repayment of
the loan. A pledge of more than two-thirds of the foreign subsidiary's stock would be treated
under IRS regulations the same as provision of a direct guarantee by the foreign subsidiary.
Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(c)(2) (2004). The regulations were passed in response to Ludwig v.
Comm., 68 T.C. 979 (1977).
28 See generally BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 20 (describing group
liability under various statutory and regulatory schemes, including tax and pension laws).
29 As will be seen in the discussion and accompanying notes in Part II, infra, the importance
of the legal entity boundaries in a borrowing group can be reduced by transaction infrastructure
that manages the diversity of legal entities.
30 See generally Steve Miller et al., A Guide to the U.S. Loan Market, STANDARD & POOR'S,
2004] 1585
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largest capital markets in the world, generating approximately $I
trillion in new loans annually in United States-based transactions alone.
In the current market, a paradigmatic syndicated loan has three tranches:
a revolving credit facility, an A term loan facility and a B term loan
facility.
A lead arranger syndicates the revolving credit facility and the A
term loan facility to commercial banks on a pro rata basis, with each
lender holding the same percentage of commitments and loans in each
of these two facilities. The lead arranger syndicates the B term loan
facility to a separate group of lenders, referred to as "institutional
investors, ' '31 who typically do not participate in either the revolving loan
or A term loan tranches. 32 The tranche B term loan facility typically has
a longer maturity date, a higher interest rate and, often, some form of
prepayment protection. When the syndicated credit facility is secured,
each of the three tranches share collateral on aparipassu basis.
In the last year, the loan market has seen the expanded use of an
additional tranche: a second-lien loan tranche that bears a higher interest
rate and often carries an even longer maturity than the tranche B term
loan facility. 33 These second-lien term loans appeal to yet an additional
class of investor, further expanding the sources of funding for
syndicated loans. 34  The syndicated loan market thus displays an
evolution towards including ever larger classes of potential lenders
under the big tent of a single set of loan documentation. 35
Oct. 2003 (describing practices in the syndicated lending market).
31 The institutional investor class traditionally is thought to include insurance companies,
prime rate mutual funds and structured investment vehicles, such as, CDOs (collateralized debt
obligations) and CLOs (collateralized loan obligations).
32 Several factors dictate that institutional investors participate in a separate tranche. First,
most of these investors are not able to fund revolving credit loans on short notice, see TCW Pro
Rata CLO Proving A Hit with Investors, LOAN MARKET WK., June 23, 2003, at 5, though
structures are being developed that overcome this obstacle. See Pierre Paulden, Highland Capital
Plans to Join Pro Rata Club with Citi CLO, LOAN MARKET WK., Dec. 15, 2003, at 1. Second,
institutional investors do not have an appetite for prepayments. Participation in the tranche B
term loan does not carry ongoing funding obligations and prepayments are structured to apply to
the tranche A term loan prior to the tranche B term loan. Sometimes, pre-payment penalties are
imposed for early payment of tranche B term loans.
33 See, e.g., Molly Jackson Sell, Second-Lien Buzz Prompts Viasystems Pop, LOAN MARKET
WK., Nov. 17, 2003, at 1; Silver Point Steps Up to Provide Second Lien Debt, LOAN MARKET
WK., July 7, 2003, at 1 (describing second lien loan as an emerging product); Merrill Tweaks
Colfax Deal, LOAN MARKET WK., June 9, 2003, at 3 (describing second lien C piece as part of
facility).
34 Loan Market's Flexibility Stands Out, LOAN MARKET WK., Nov. 3, 2003 (describing
hedge funds as new investors in the loan market). When commercial banks and other institutional
investors were unable to provide needed liquidity to the loan market, non-traditional investors
such as hedge funds provided needed liquidity to the market, attracted by alternate structures such
as second-lien tranches. In the third quarter of 2003, over seventy-five percent of the investors in
the loan market were not commercial banks. Hedge funds made up forty percent of the investors
in loans priced at LIBOR plus a spread of four percent or more. See id.
35 Tranche B term loans for institutional investors almost always appear as part of the
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One way to view the increased concern of lenders over obtaining a
perfected security interest in all assets of a borrowing group is to focus
on demands and expectations created by inclusion of more lenders in a
syndicated lending group. As a borrowing group satisfies more of its
credit needs through a syndicated loan, more certain and extensive
collateral coverage is required. This is particularly true if syndicated
loans are to maintain their record for being the asset class with the
highest percentage return in a banktruptcy. 36 The way to preserve the
high rates of return in default scenarios is to bring a higher percentage
of debtor assets under the umbrella of a perfected security interest as a
greater percentage of a debtor's funding needs are supplied by the
syndicated credit. In the ideal secured lending world, all assets reflected
on a borrowing group's balance sheet would be included in the
collateral package. This allows, to the greatest extent possible,
evaluation of the consolidated credit as an asset class unto itself.
In its typical form, such a complicated lending structure is
documented on a transaction-by-transaction basis, with all tranches
committed (in the case of the revolving facility) and funded (in the case
of the tranche A and tranche B term loans) at the same time using a
single set of closing documents. To enhance flexibility, however, lead
arrangers have worked with borrowers to develop contract provisions
that permit the inclusion of delayed draw term loans37 and the addition
or expansion of tranches without the need for additional existing lender
consents.38 Such provisions remove hold-up value from the hands of a
few rogue lenders who otherwise might object to expansion. Most
recently, a controversial contract provision has surfaced that permits the
replacement of lenders who object to amendments to the credit facility
that require unanimous lender consent, further promoting flexibility. 39
documentation for the traditional commercial bank credit facility. Sometimes a second lien loan
tranche is included as part of the same documentation and sometime it appears as part of a
separately agented facility. Compare West Point Slips, LOAN MARKET WK., Aug. 25, 2003, at 2
(reporting second lien tranche as separately agented) with Merrill Tweaks Colfax Deal, supra note
33 (describing second lien C piece as part of facility). Indeed, the rapid growth of second-lien
loans has resulted in a recent call for standardization of terms. See Second-Lien Influx Prompts
Call For Standards, LOAN MARKET WK., Jan. 26, 2004, at 1. The emerging pattem of negotiated
points include: (i) the collateral entitled to first lien status; (ii) whether the amount of first lien
debt is capped; (iii) quiet lien provisions that require the second lien holders to delay exercise of
remedies; (iv) whether the first lien holder needs the second lien holder's consent to approve a
debtor-in-possession financing; and (v) whether second lien holders are entitled to request
adequate protection payments or challenge those made to first lien holders. Id.
36 See, e.g., Steven O'Shea et al., Bank Loan and Bond Recovery Study: 1997-2000, LOAN
PRODUCTS SPECIAL REPORT (Fitch Ratings), Mar. 19, 2001.
37 CSFB Cuts NUI Pricing, Adds Delayed-Draw Loan, LOAN MARKET WK., Nov. 24, 2003,
at 3.
38 See Pulte Builds in L/C Capability, LOAN MARKET WK., Nov. 3, 2003 (describing
inclusion of "accordion" feature that allows expansion of facility); Silgan Adds Senior Debt,
LOAN MARKET WK., Nov. 17, 2003, at 8 (citing rumor of "accordion" facility add on).
39 See Buyside Frustrated as Contested Allied Waste Amendment Passes, LOAN MARKET
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The overall trend is to promote contracting efficiencies by eliminating
bilateral contracting in any form. The contracting structures reap the
benefits of the contracting efficiences of shared documentation, without
sacrificing flexibility or doling out hold up value, both of which might
create increased costs for future contracting. The life span of an
existing set of syndicated loan transaction documentation is being
extended by pre-agreed parameters for expansion of the facility and
nuanced voting procedures. 40
Significantly, one contracting technique available for use in
unsecured syndicated lending is not available for a secured loan
program. To reduce steps in an unsecured loan, a lead arranger might
negotiate with a top tier or second tier holding company for negative
pledge covenants 41 and limitations on debt incurrence by subsidiares.
Such a structure allows the syndicate to contract solely with top tier
holding companies and dispense with subsidiary guarantees and security
agreements. Such a structure, however, does not protect against willful
breaches of covenants by the holding company or against involuntary
liens. Such protection comes only with perfected security interests
provided by each member of a borrowing group. Though multiple
entities might sign a single security agreement to enhance efficiency,
separate procedures for perfecting and monitoring the security interest
are performed on an entity by entity basis.
Ongoing efforts at reducing contracting costs continue for
syndicated lending in the form of projects to develop standard form
WK., Aug. 25, 2003, at 1. Voting procedures in syndicated loans with multiple tranches have
potential to prompt disputes. See Redwood Master Fund, Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd., 2002 WL
3167629 (Dec. 11, 2002) (Rimer, J.). For a description of the case, see Syndicated Loans-
Position of Minority Lenders, BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT'L BANKING & FIN. L., Mar. 2003, at 88-
90 Typically, a credit facility requires unanimous consent to amend certain core loan terms, such
as principal amount, interest rate or interest rate spread and maturity.
40 The life span of credit agreement documentation is being extended in the form of flexible
pricing mechanisms. Typically, the syndicated loan is priced at a floating interest rate, not at a
fixed interest rate. Further, the interest spread charged above the floating rate index varies with
pricing specified on a grid. The grid pricing fluctuates based either upon credit rating or
performance measured by financial covenants. Such a structure protects against junior security
holders (i.e., the equity investors in the borrowing group) exporting risk upon senior security
holders (i.e., the bank lenders) once a transaction has closed. Grid pricing reduces incentives for
opportunistic behavior on the part of junior security holders as the pricing mechanism protects
against replacing safe projects with risky projects once a syndicated loan is committed and
funded. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 613 (1984) (describing opportunistic behavior of junior security holders). The
loan market has developed similar contract structures that address other contracting problems
predicted by economists. For example, a "competitive advance feature" allows lenders in a
syndicate to make non-pro rata advances at lower interest rate spreads than reflected on a pricing
grid. This potential intra-syndicate competition removes potential advantages that might accrue
to a lending syndicate that sets its loan spreads too high.
41 See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property
and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999) (describing various negative pledge covenants).
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contracts for syndicates. 42 And, to facilitate secondary market trading
of syndicated loans, provision has been made recently to assign CUSIP
numbers to syndicated loans.43 Further, the syndicated loan market is
evolving into a market that increasingly expects published credit
ratings.44 Standardized terms, credit ratings and tracking mechanisms
should enhance liquidity, further expanding the attractiveness of
syndicated loans as an asset class for a wide spectrum of lenders. The
time needed to execute a syndicated loan is being compressed, reducing
yet another species of transaction cost.4 5 However, current procedures
needed to secure a syndicated loan impose significant time constraints
and other costs inconsistent with the progress made in streamlining the
general contracting process. This can be seen most clearly by the
continued use of "springing liens" in syndicated credit facilities, in
which security interests are created after the closing of the loan.46 In
this environment, the loan market is primed for additional techniques to
enhance certainty, to reduce contracting costs and to speed up the
process whereby collateral becomes part of the credit facility package.
42 See The Loan Syndications & Trading Association, Inc., Model Credit Agreement
Provisions (dated Jan. 2003), available at http://www.lsta.org/lsta-
marketinformation/ModelCreditAgreement Provisions.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
43 The CUSIP is a unique identification number assigned to a security to facilitate market
trading. See Press Release, The LSTA and Standard & Poor's Expand CUSIP Numbers to
Syndicated Loans, STANDARD & POOR'S, Jan. 6, 2004, available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/LSTACUSIPI.6.04.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2004); Cusips Are Coming As Loan Mart UPS Standardization, LOAN MARKET WK., Nov. 3,
2003.
44 See Steven M. Bavaria, Syndicated Loans-A Rated Market, at Last!, STANDARD &
POOR'S, Feb, 12, 2002
45 The development of the syndicated lending market has even resulted in the formation of a
now public company, Intralinks, Inc., to facilitate the electronic distribution of documents to
transaction participants. See IntraLinks, Inc. webpage dedicated to loan syndication, at
http://www.intralinks.com/yb/dcmSynd.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
46 A "springing lien" is a security interest that is granted after the closing of a loan to secure
antecedent debt. Typically, a borrower agrees to provide collateral to lenders upon some future
condition that makes them pessimistic about the prospects of repayment, such as a credit
downgrade or the violation of a covenant. If the covenant is never breached or the downgrade
never comes, then the cost and expense of providing collateral was saved. If, however, collateral
must be granted, then the perfection of the security interest creates serious risk of avoidance as a
preference under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000). Further, one must
consider the incentives of a borrower to comply with its covenant to provide security once it has
the funding, particularly if it is already in default. Nevertheless, use of springing liens remains a
common phenomenon. See, e.g., Banks Shop Amphenol Redux, LOAN MARKET WK., Apr. 14,
2003, at 3; Investors Tolerate Disappearing Lien to Stay in Wine Co. Deal, LOAN MARKET WK.,
Mar. 24, 2003, at 1; Jack In The Box Springs Into New Credit, LOAN MARKET WK., Feb. 24,
2003. at 6.
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C. A Model for Borrowing Groups and Syndicates as Cost Reduction
Techniques
We can easily see how the formation of borrowing groups and loan
syndicates reduces the direct cost of contracting for financing by
considering the outline of a simple model. 47  Suppose that (i) a
borrowing group contains n legal entities, (ii) each legal entity has
financing requirements for a single project equal to a uniform amount
(e.g., $50 million), (iii) each potential lender for the project has a
maximum loan amount so that it can supply only a portion of the
funding needed to finance a project (e.g., $10 million), such that it takes
m lenders to finance a single project (in this example, five lenders per
$50 million project),48 (iv) the total number of potential lenders for
projects is at least inn, so all projects in a borrowing group may be
financed, 49 and (v) the cost to negotiate and document an individual
loan agreement is equal to K.50  In such a case, the total direct
negotiation and documentation costs paid by the borrowing group 5' for
its financing needs if each of its members uses bilateral loan contracts
with individual lenders is equal to mnK.
If, in contrast to the full bilateral contract approach, a single lead
arranging lender (the "lead arranger") acts for all lenders to the
borrowing group certain efficiences can be achieved in the contracting
process. However, these efficiency gains are offset to some degree
47 A model developed to explain why financial intermediaries, such as banks, exist to act
between depositor/investors and borrowers inspired the model described in this paper for loan
syndication. See D. Diamond, Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring, 51 REV.
ECON. STUD. 393 (1984); see also XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET,
MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING (4th ed. 1999) (describing and summarizing Diamond's results).
48 The size of loans made by individual lenders may be limited for a variety of reasons,
including regulatory limits on the permitted size of credit exposure to individual credits and asset
diversification preferences dictated by portfolio risk management strategies. See, e.g., Dennis &
Mullineaux, supra note 17.
49 If single risk limits and diversification requirements were applied on a legal entity/project
basis, rather than on a borrowing group basis, a smaller number of lenders might be needed to
finance all projects. In that case we might assume that some lenders make loans to multiple
projects. Nevertheless, assuming mn number of lenders allows us to avoid assumptions relating
to the details of these limiting factors.
50 Treating K as a constant regardless of transaction size or number of lenders and borrowers
involved is a simplifying assumption. In reality, certain contracting and administrative costs will
be higher for a larger credit facility. My experience, however, suggests that the differences do not
create significant distortions that affect the usefulness of the model as an illustration of the cost
reduction phenomenon.
51 The convention in loan financing is that borrowers pay their own counsel fees and
expenses and also reimburse the lender or lending syndicate for its legal fees, costs and expenses.
The borrower pays all filing fees and taxes. An additional significant cost to a borrower or
borrowing group is the borrower's management time devoted to negotiating and documenting the
loan and, thereafter, to providing ongoing monitoring information to the lender or lead agent with
respect to the loan or credit facility.
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because the lead arranger charges an amount, designated as C, for
arranging a group of lenders into a syndicate and acting as an
intermediary. A borrower or group of borrowers pays the lead arranger
this fee to reduce the direct costs of bilateral contracting with individual
lenders.
We assume that the group of lenders allows the lead arranger to
negotiate and document transactions on the group's behalf because the
lead arranger also is a lender with a significant stake to lose. The lead
arranger has the same incentive as the other members of the group to
negotiate a favorable transaction and the lead arranger signals this
alignment of interest by retaining a portion of the credit facility.5 2
Further, the lead arranger will suffer reputational harm if it fails
properly to negotiate, document and monitor a transaction.
Reputational harm will impair a lead arranger's ability to earn future
fees as a loan syndicator.5 3 Given this signal, coupled with the cost
imposed by potential loss of reputation, the group of lenders does not
require additional monitoring of the lead arranger so further costs are
not incurred by the lenders.
In the first case, a lead arranger acts for a syndicate of lenders but
each member of the borrowing group separately negotiates for funding
with the lead arranger.5 4 The total direct negotiation and documentation
costs paid by the borrowing group for its financing needs in this case is
equal to nK + C. (Syndicated lending will be more efficient than direct
bilateral lending in this scenario if, and only if, mnK > nK + C.) Note
that, in the absence of a syndicate, the borrowing group is unable to
achieve efficiencies by designating a primary borrower to negotiate all
loan agreements with individual lenders. Such a structure merely
results in the same number of costs being incurred (i.e., mnK) as the
primary debtor still must negotiate mn number of loan agreements in
bilateral negotiations with lenders. The only difference in these loan
agreements is that the primary debtor appears as the borrower rather
than the individual legal entities that make up the balance of the
52 The size of the portion of a syndicated loan retained by the agent appears correlated with
interest rates charged to borrowers. See LUCA CASOLARO ET AL., THE PRICING EFFECT OF
CERTIFICATION ON BANK LOANS: EVIDENCE FROM THE SYNDICATED CREDIT MARKET
(Universita degli Studi del Molise, Econ. & Stats. Discussion Paper No. 10/03, 2003). A larger
retained portion of the loan sends a stronger signal from the agent that the quality of the loan is
high. The signal of higher quality explains the lower interest rate.
53 Models developed to explain the existence of financial intermediaries use potential lost
reputation, and the attendant loss of future business, to explain why banks honor loan
commitments. See Arnoud W. A. Boot et al., Credible Commitments, Contract Enforcement
Problems and Banks: Intermediation as Credibility Assurance, 15 J. BANKING & FIN. 605 (1991).
Banks have both financial capital and reputational capital in models such as these.
54 Such a structure is possible but, in practice, would be unusual in the syndicated loan market
except for loans to very large, diversified companies with subsidiary operations in different lines
of business.
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borrowing group. Thus, in this model, the formation of syndicates is a
logical pre-requisite to achieving efficiencies by creating borrowing
groups. Given the existence of a syndicate, we can see in our second
case below how a consolidated family of companies may create further
efficiencies by forming a borrowing group and designating a primary
debtor.55
In the second case, the legal entities in the borrowing group
designate a primary debtor in the group to negotiate a single loan
agreement on behalf of the borrowing group with the lead arranger. In
this case, the total direct negotiation and documentation costs paid by
the borrowing group to obtain its financing needs is reduced to K + C.
(Syndicated lending will be more efficient than direct bilateral lending
in this scenario if, and only if, mnK > K + C.) When the primary debtor
in such a situation is a holding company that is in an ownership and
control position with respect to the other members of the borrowing
group, the primary debtor can credibly enter into a single loan
agreement for the borrowing group by agreeing that it will cause the
other legal entities in the group to comply with the covenants that it has
negotiated for the group. If the lending syndicate desires direct claims
against subsidiaries, all subsidiaries may sign a single guarantee
agreement.
Ongoing costs for monitoring the overall credit extended to the
consolidated family of companies similarly are reduced by use of
borrowing groups and syndicates rather than individual bilateral
contracting. This can be seen by using the forumulas above, but letting
K represent ongoing monitoring costs for a particular loan agreement
and letting C represent periodic agency fees charged by the lead bank
for the syndicate to compensate the lead for its ongoing administrative
role in acting as agent. If the borrowing group prepares consolidated
financial reports for other purposes (such as making reports to equity
security holders), the syndicate can replace monitoring of individual
legal entities with monitoring of the entire borrowing group without
imposing a material increased information preparation cost on the
borrowing group. In some cases, it might even be more expensive for a
borrowing group to provide audited information with respect to
individual group members than to provide information on a
consolidated group basis.
The foregoing suggests that syndicated lending becomes a
preferred funding strategy anytime the lead bank is prepared to charge C
55 This is because the aggregate amount of funding required by the group remains the same,
as does the loan size limit imposed on each lender. There are still n projects to be financed and
each lender may supply funding for only a portion of each project such that m lenders are required
per project. It does not matter whether each legal entity separately contracts, or one legal entity
contracts for all: in both cases the cost will be mnK.
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in an amount such that C < (mn - 1)K. (Note that m > 1 and n > 1). In
the case where the lending syndicate funds a single borrower, the
syndication strategy becomes a preferred funding strategy whenever C <
(m - 1)K. Thus, in every case where C < K, syndicated lending will
dominate as a strategy and, in many cases where C > K, syndicated
lending will dominate. As the number of borrower legal entities and
lenders involved in a financing increases, the maximum allowable value
that C may take while preserving syndication as the dominant strategy
increases. These relationships in the model suggest that cost savings for
both contracting and monitoring at least partially explain the rapid
expansion in the syndicated lending market over the last several
decades. 56
To further enhance the model, assume that all the contracting and
monitoring costs K for an unsecured financing are present in a secured
financing. 57 Further assume that in a bilateral secured financing, the
lender takes only a single asset or asset class as collateral for the loan.
In a syndicated loan, the lenders share collateral on a pari passu basis.
Thus, when syndicated lending dominates as a funding strategy, it will
dominate even if the syndication process does not materially reduce the
additional contracting and monitoring costs associated with providing
collateral security from the costs of providing collateral security for a
series of bilateral loan transactions secured by collateral consisting of
individual assets or asset classes.
For example, in a bilateral lending situation, one lender might take
security in a debtor's copyrights, another lender might take security in a
debtor's real estate and a third lender might take security in a debtor's
inventory and receivables. Each grant of collateral requires searches
and filings in different recording systems. Though use of a single
syndicated loan would reduce the contracting costs associated with
negotiating the loan agreement (three agreements are replaced with
56 Significantly, syndicated lending allows a debtor to raise significant capital from a large
pool of lenders without either filing a registration statement with the SEC or complying with rules
and regulations to achieve private placement status exempting a financing from such filing
requirements. This is because bank loans are not considered securities under the Securities Act of
1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e-g., Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); C.N.S. Enters. v. G&G Enters.,
508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of
Lubbock Tex., 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First
Nat'l Bank of Hereford Tex., 495 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1974). This position has not changed
even though syndicated loans are marketed to non-bank investors, including mutual funds, in
which the public invests. Exemption from these regulatory burdens offers an additional cost
savings rationale for the growth of syndicated lending.
57 This is true, at least, for the large financing transactions considered here. In other contexts,
taking collateral might be seen as a strategy for reducing ongoing monitoring costs. In equipment
financing, for example, a creditor with a perfected security interest might simply monitor the
condition of the equipment and related insurance without undertaking to monitor the financial
condition of the debtor generally.
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one), the use of syndication does not reduce the procedures that must be
taken to perfect a security interest in the total collateral package.
Nevertheless, syndicated lending will still dominate bilateral lending
based on the costs saved by negotiating a single loan agreement rather
than multiple loan agreements.
Syndicated lending may, however, achieve some efficiencies over
bilateral lending with respect to procedures to take collateral security
when a single filing office is involved. For example, in a bilateral
lending situation, one lender might take security in a debtor's inventory,
another lender might take security in a debtor's accounts, and a third
lender might take security in a debtor's equipment. All three of these
filings are made in the same UCC filing office. Each lender would need
to conduct its own search and file and monitor its own financing
statement. In the syndicated loan, a single search is conducted and a
single financing statement is filed and monitored. In this case,
syndicated lending reduces the cost of taking collateral security.
Even though syndicated lending will reduce some costs associated
with providing collateral to secure a loan, the contracting efficiences for
the loan agreement often exceed the efficiences related to provision of
collateral. To see how contracting practices for unsecured loans have
outpaced procedures for providing collateral to secure them, one simply
needs to consider an average borrowing group with fifty legal entities
that wants to obtain secured financing using inventory, copyrights and
real estate as collateral (assume one owned parcel of real estate per legal
entity). With syndicated lending, the loan agreement process has been
reduced to one contracting step.58 The collateral process still requires
150 different steps, each with many subparts, even if a single security
agreement is signed by all parties. If one assumes a model of bilateral
contracting for loans, with each lender taking a single asset or asset
class as security, the procedures used to provide collateral for secured
loans do not appear particularly inefficient. However, when the loan
negotiation process is made more efficient by eliminating bilateral
contracting, it becomes apparent that the process of creating security
interests remains a source of significant inefficiencies. To further focus
on the differences, let us contrast in more detail the dream of the
commercial finance attorney with the reality. This exercise should
show why transaction infrastructure needs to be developed for security
interests if contracting efficiencies in syndicated lending are to evolve.
58 An interesting historical illustration of how syndicated lending has made life easier for
management now than in pre-syndication days is illustrated by capital raising activities of robber
baron types. See RON CHERNow, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (1998)
(describing how Rockefeller travelled from bank to bank to raise sufficient funding for operation
of his company).
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D. The Dream
The dream of any commercial finance attorney representing
lenders is to have the power to orchestrate creation of a first priority
perfected secured transaction with the stroke of a pen, while sitting in a
conference room far above the hustle and bustle of the street below.
The security interest would cover all assets of a debtor, without worry
over asset type. In such a fantasy, the secured lender obtains priority
over all other creditors, including other secured creditors, unsecured
creditors, judgment lien holders and the taxing authorities. The dream
is, thus, simply a species of the general fantasy that a variety of
transaction costs might be eliminated (save, of course, the attorney's
fee).
E. The Reality
The reality of commercial finance practice differs dramatically
from the dream. The lender's attorney must worry about a variety of
problems on the street below. Asset types matter because different
assets types require that different ceremonies be performed to create the
secured credit relationship in a form that society will recognize. 59
Information sources matter because the attorney must commission
different searches of filing offices and registries to confirm the presence
or absence of potentially prior claims to different kinds of collateral. 60
In some cases, possession of collateral by third parties,6' other than the
debtor, or the mere status of a third party,62 may create priorities not
reflected by a search of public records. Further diligence must be done
to identify reliably those existing secured claims that do not require
some form of public recording to sustain their priority.63
59 Examples include: ordinary equipment (for which a UCC filing or possession is used to
perfect a security interest), a deposit account (for which "control" is the exclusive method of
perfection) and federally registered copyrights (for which a filing with the United States
Copyright Office is required for perfection). See supra text accompanying note 58; see also infra
notes at 108-11, 122-29 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 59. Additional examples of separate filing offices include those for aircraft
and ships. See infra notes at 139-43 and accompanying text.
61 For example, a security interest in certificated securities may be created by "control,"
possession or filing a financing statement.
62 For example, a bank has a priority claim to funds on deposit with it and a broker has a
priority claim to securities held through a securities account maintained by a customer. In each
case, the priority is based upon the status of the bank and the broker.
63 This supplemental diligence relies heavily on representations and warranties made by
debtors.
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In practice, the process of creating 64 a secured transaction breaks
down into three phases. One task of the lender's attorney is to develop
a report for the client that identifies other creditors of the debtor and the
extent of any priority that those other creditors may have. This often
requires that the attorney draw on multiple information sources. 65
Significantly, there is no one-stop shopping source for this
information.66 Further, information available from public sources, even
if collected in one place, presents an incomplete picture of the debtor's
financial position vis-ti-vis other potential secured creditors. 67
Assuming the attorney's client is prepared to make a loan based on
the contents of this report, a second task for the lender's attorney is to
draft and negotiate a security agreement 68 that gives the lender the right
to take away the debtor's assets, if the debtor does not repay the lender.
The third task is to insert certain information into public records
about the lender's new security interest (or to orchestrate other publicly
observable steps) to advertise that the lender has a limited property
interest in the debtor's assets. The publication of the security interest
transforms the rights of the lender in the collateral good against the
debtor into rights of the lender in the collateral generally good against
64 An important additional task remains after creation of the security interest-the task of
monitoring the secured transaction to make sure that perfection and priority of the security
interest are maintained through the passage of time and changes in debtor circumstances.
Significantly, outside law firms religiously avoid responsibility for this monitoring role, taking
great care to put responsibility for monitoring transactions with in-house compliance departments
at the commercial lender.
65 Literature discussing the efficient capital market thesis contains a taxonomy of information
costs. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 594. The debtor is in the best position to
efficiently provide information about its prior secured transactions. However, there are reasons to
worry about the accuracy of this information source because debtors lie. Id.
66 The due diligence often is facilitated by use of a so-called "Perfection Certificate" that the
secured lender asks the debtor to complete. The Perfection Certificate is a compilation of
representations and warranties both about the current state of the debtor's affairs and about its
past history, such as prior mergers, name changes, reincorporations and chief executive office
moves. The general thrust of the inquiry is to determine each and every factor that might affect
the priority of the security interest that the secured lender will receive from the particular debtor.
Typically, the Perfection Certificate also requests identification of bank accounts and security
accounts, a listing of stock certificates representing ownership interests in subsidiaries of the
debtor, a listing of instruments held by the debtor and makes further inquiries about other items of
Article 9 collateral. The information sought often extends beyond the scope needed to perfect
and analyze the priority of security interests under Article 9. The Perfection Certificate may seek
information about insurance policies, intellectual property, vehicles, airplanes, boats, railcars, the
location of real property, the location of leased property (including identification of the landlord)
and so on. Often, a debtor is asked to estimate the value of the collateral not subject to Article 9
perfection procedures so that the secured lender can decide whether or not to require the debtor to
perform additional procedures to perfect the lien granted in non-Article 9 collateral. Sometimes,
the secured creditor requests appraisals to assist its evaluation.
67 For example, the information required to be included in a financing statement is extremely
brief, requiring no details of the secured financing. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502(a), 9-516(b).
68 See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1973).
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the world of third parties.69
In practice, significant aspects of the searching/information
gathering task and the public filing task are delegated to private
companies that specialize in searches and filings. Though these
companies employ attorneys on their staffs to help them do their jobs,
the companies are not technically practicing law. When these private
companies are engaged to work on a transaction, the commercial
finance attorney's role in the first and third tasks is limited to
identification of the scope of the searches to be conducted, evaluation of
the search results, approval of the form that the new filings will take and
identification of the offices in which new filings will be made. The
searching and filing tasks are passed on to the search company. In
complex transactions involving multiple jurisdictions, the primary
lender's attorney is hampered because he or she is likely admitted to
practice only in a single jurisdiction. 70
Typically, lender's counsel performs these tasks in parallel with
debtor's counsel. Debtor's counsel uses the assembled information to
prepare a legal opinion to be delivered to the lender confirming (i) the
creation of a security interest enforceable against the debtor, (ii) the
perfection of the security interest, and, in some cases, (iii) the priority of
the security interest.7' Often, these opinions are accompanied by a "no-
conflict" opinion stating that the creation, perfection and priority of the
new security interest will not violate other existing agreements of the
debtor.72
The opinion covering the creation of the security interest and the
"no-conflicts" opinion both are contract law tasks. Expressing an
opinion on perfection and priority are property law tasks, albeit ones
that assume the existence of an enforceable security interest.
Preparation of the security interest and no-conflict opinions is
viewed as a difficult, risky task, whereas rendering the enforceability
opinion is considered routine. The difference relates to the information
69 Certain exceptions exist that allow third parties to purchase collateral free and clear of the
security interest. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-320. Publication in some form is required to create
property. See, e.g., Organizational Law, supra note 8 (contrasting property law tasks with
contract law tasks); JEANNE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES (1997) (describing
publicity as an element of a property interest).
70 Often, this leads to the hiring of "local" counsel to render advice on perfection and priority
of security interests. This urge to hire local expertise exists notwithstanding the "uniform" nature
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
71 Some revisions to Article 9 were made with the express purpose of making it easier for
practicing attorneys to render legal opinions. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,
How Successful was the Revision of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 1357, 1397 (1999) [hereinafter Harris & Mooney, Revision of UCC Article 9].
72 The typical violation would occur if the debtor had an existing agreement with a third party
known as a "negative pledge" in which the debtor agreed either not to create security interests in
favor of third parties or only to create such security interests on an equal and ratable or
subordinated basis.
2004] 1597
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
boundaries related to the tasks.
In the case of the enforceability opinion, the attorney is able to
render an opinion by examining the contract itself, in isolation from
other factors. The attorney either will assume that the debtor has
properly authorized the execution and delivery of the security
agreement or the attorney also will render an opinion on authorization
based upon the attorney's involvement in orchestrating the corporate or
other approval for the secured transaction as a whole. In either case, all
the information necessary to render the opinion is ready to hand.
In the case of the security interest opinion and, to a lesser extent,
the no-conflict opinion, the attorney typically is relying, at least in part,
on information received from third party sources, and not on his own
knowledge of the facts. The process of monitoring security interests
using opinions or their equivalent continues past the closing. The
security interest filings often have a limited effective duration. Further,
subsequent changes in corporate structure, name or, to a limited extent,
office location, require supplemental procedures to maintain perfection.
Thus, ongoing monitoring is required to maintain the status achieved at
the closing.
Recently, competition for the security interest opinion has surfaced
in the form of insurance policies provided by companies expanding
their traditional real estate title insurance business. The new insurance
policies insure the perfection and priority of security interests in
personal property. Though the insurers currently advertise their product
as a supplement to the traditional security interest legal opinion, it may
well develop into a replacement. Competition for the no-conflict
opinion has not developed.
The rise of insurance products for secured transactions in personal
property suggests a few things. First, lenders might not feel confident
in their own ability properly to evaluate and monitor perfection and
priority of secured loans. 73 Second, lenders might not feel comfortable
turning to their outside lawyers to evaluate and monitor this status for
them. Third, outside lawyers might not wish to engage in this sort of
evaluation and monitoring. 74 Fourth, even if outside lawyers wished to
engage in this sort of evaluation and monitoring, they might not be able
73 This may be true even though the agent bank for a secured loan typically charges an annual
"collateral management fee" that exceeds its annual agency fee for an unsecured loan. In an
unsecured transaction with an annual agent bank fee of $150,000 the comparable fee for agent
services on a secured loan might be as high as $500,000.
74 The typical legal opinion rendered in a secured transaction disclaims any obligation to
consider facts and circumstances after the date of the opinion. It may note different steps that
ought to be taken in the future but does not undertake to take those steps or to monitor whether
they have been taken. This approach differs from what economic theory might predict. See Peter
Teece, Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39
(1982) (describing economies of scope, as opposed to scale, that result from the production of a
number of different products by a single firm).
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to provide this service to their lender clients on a cost effective basis. In
any case, the market is telling us that there is a demand for more
evaluation and monitoring services and insurance companies are
promoting the idea that insurance policies, rather than more legal
services, are the right product to answer this demand. The problem is
aggravated because, when lenders insist on insurance of this type, one
can expect the cost to be borne by borrowers.
One conclusion we might draw from this is that lawyers have not
been functioning as effective transaction cost engineers in the arena of
secured credit. Another conclusion is that, in the area of large-scale
commercial finance, we have failed to structure our laws in ways that
permit cost effective and certain monitoring by the parties to the
transaction and their counsel. On the positive side, we might conclude
that the recent amendments to Article 9 were, at least, a partial success
because the law became simple and clear enough so that insurance
companies now are prepared to offer a product, whereas with the former
more complex state of the law, such an insurance business was thought
to be too risky.7
To assist in a proper diagnosis of the phenomenon, let us consider
how creation of transaction infrastructure might improve the situation.
II. BUILDING THE LOTL INFRASTRUCTURE
Business organizations invest in infrastructure, such as computer
networks, telephone systems and assembly lines. The hope is that
investment in infrastructure today will make information management,
communication and product creation more efficient in the future.
Business organizations use the infrastructure assets over and over again.
Business organizations also invest in what might be called "transaction
infrastructure." Transaction infrastructure comes in many flavors; these
include the development of standard form contracts, filing a shelf
registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission or
entering into master agreements with repeat contracting parties. A
business organization creates a highly visible form of transaction
infrastructure when it sets up a so-called "master trust" to facilitate
securitization transactions. In each case, the hope is that investment in
transaction infrastructure today will reduce costs of closing transactions
in the future. Transaction infrastructure also is used over and over again
75 One positive step was the creation of a single, certain location to file a financing statement
against "registered organizations," such as domestic corporations. See U.C.C. § 9-307, following
the suggestion of Lynn M. LoPucki; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of
Incorporation Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 577 (1995) [hereinafter A Systems Analysis].
20041 1599
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
in lieu of creating new documentation for each transaction.
A. The LOTL Strategy
Our current rules for creating a secured credit transaction start with
the background assumptions that debtors lie and steal. 76 Accordingly,
the ceremonies society specifies for successful creation of the secured
credit relationship promote at least one of two goals. The ceremonies
either counteract lying by debtors or prevent stealing by debtors (or
both). The law is structured such that, if the secured party does not take
steps to counteract at least one of these debtor character flaws, the
secured credit relationship typically is not "perfected." The secured
creditor may not enforce an unperfected security interest in debtor
collateral against third parties. The LOTL strategy is to develop
transaction infrastructure primarily using existing legal rules that
counteract lying by debtors. Supplemental techniques enhance the
credibility of representations made by debtors about their secured credit
status. By examining the extent to which the LOTL strategy can be
implemented, and identifying impediments, a program for further legal
reform might be developed. 7
Traditionally, creditors have counteracted lying and stealing by
debtors on a transaction-by-transaction basis. A particular creditor
publishes notice of its security interest in a public record or takes
possession of the collateral when it makes a loan to the debtor. 78 In
76 "The world is full of cheaters, liars and thieves. There is no reason to believe that such
persons are under-represented in the debtor class." R. SPEIDEL ET AL., COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW 234 (2d ed. 1974); see also Douglas G Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession
and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 190 (1983)
(referring to the problem as one of debtors "misbehav[ing]"); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T.
Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1150 (1979)
(referring to the problem as the "threat of debtor misbehavior"). Secured lending thus is seen as
an area of the law where informal norms of fair dealing do not play a significant role. See
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963) for a discussion of areas in which norms and customs may play a larger role in
governing behavior of economic actors. The secured lending laws theorize creditors to be honest
folks that are unable reliably to identify and avoid dishonest debtors. Cf ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 152 (1991). The phenomenon of
lying by business persons in our society is widespread, as evidenced by recent corporate scandals
involving Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and other major corporations. Lying also has been the subject
of general scholarly inquiry. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING, MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
77 Suggestions for further changes in laws affecting secured credit appear in Part V, infra.
78 There is some debate over the extent to which taking possession of an asset provides a
useful form of notice to potential secured parties of prior claims. Compare Baird & Jackson,
supra note 76, at 212 (concluding that "[plossession of personal property is the best evidence of
its ownership"), with James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance
and New Filing Rules, 79 MINN. L. REv. 529, 545 (1995) (suggesting that possession is no longer
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contrast, the LOTL strategy is to replace the transaction-by-transaction
approach with a single structural solution. In effect, a system of
floating secured parties is created in which particular secured creditors
come and go underneath the umbrella of a single nominee secured
party. Recent scholarship has underestimated the ability to create
floating secured parties and thus missed an opportunity to more fully
consider the essential commonality between artificial persons and
alternative legal structures, such as security interests. 79 The LOTL
transaction infrastructure satisfies the basic requirement of property law
that the secured party publicly identify a reliable party from whom
information about secured credit may be obtained as a condition to
recognition of the property interest. Thereafter, individual secured
parties need only take steps under contract law to obtain the protection
afforded secured creditors by entering into a contract with the debtor
and the lien lord.
As a logical matter, creating a third party lien lord is nothing more
or less than creating what logicians might call a rigid designator. It is
the permanent address of the unique someone who will tell the truth
about all the related debtor's secured credit situation. To be efficient, a
debtor may have but one truth teller. Consolidated companies that form
a borrowing group will each use the same truth teller. The records of
the lien lord will reflect a debtor's membership in a borrowing group so
that a request for information about one member of the group generates
a report disclosing the secured credit status of the entire group.
Transaction infrastructure will be created around this rigid designator as
filings, registrations and other procedures are performed using the lien
lord's name and contact information. We want to create transaction
infrastructure that will last. At the same time, however, we do not want
allow any particular person who is designated as a lien lord to have a
practical monopoly over services to a debtor or borrowing group by
virtue of having been selected to act as lien lord. Thus, we want a lien
lord that is portable. Thus, the first step is to create a portable rigid
designator.
B. Creating a Lien Lord
To facilitate portability, an independent special purpose company
is formed to act as lien lord for a debtor. If the debtor is a holding
a good indicator of ownership). The LOTL strategy is firmly of the view that possession is not a
useful method of providing notice of security interests for large enterprises. Rather, possession
promotes the goal of preventing stealing by debtors who would otherwise transfer assets to third
parties and dissipate the proceeds to the detriment of secured creditors.
79 See Organizational Law, supra note 8.
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company for subsidiaries, the same lien lord will act for each member of
the consolidated group of companies that form a borrowing group. The
lien lord has a post-office box, telephone number, web page and e-mail
address. An institution (known as a "lien lord operating company")
with significant reputation-based and, perhaps, financial capital owns
the lien lord. Lien lords and lien lord operating companies are not
licensed or regulated by any state.80 The marketplace will decide the
reputation and financial capital needed for a lien lord credibly to vouch
for the secured credit status of the debtor.
Candidates for the position of lien lord operating company include
insurance companies who issue security interest insurance policies,
commercial banks who act as agents on syndicated loans, companies
who perform UCC search and filing services, and law firms. The use of
the special purpose company to act as lien lord creates flexibility so that
a debtor may change lien lord operators by simply directing a transfer of
lien lord ownership to a replacement lien lord operator that meets
established criteria.81 Alternately, a debtor may form its own lien lord
and simply transfer the shares of this entity to an independent lien lord
operator when it wishes to engage in a significant secured loan
transaction. In practice, the possibility of easy transfer of the LOTL
80 Prior suggestions to use private filing offices have been made. See Steven L. Harris &
Charles W. Mooney, Negotiability, Electronic Commercial Practices, and a New Structure for
the UCC Article 9 Filing System: Tapping the Private Market for Information Technology, 31
IDAHO L. REV. 835 (1995) [hereinafter Private Information Market]. Professors Harris and
Mooney served as Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revise Article 9 and as Reporters for
the Permanent Editorial Board UCC Article 9 Study Committee. See Harris & Mooney, Revision
of UCC Article 9, supra note 71. A significant motivation for the suggestion in Private
Information Market was to work around the inability of state filing offices to timely record filed
financing statements. With the advent of electronic filing systems, this initial motivation is less
pressing. However, the proposal continues to have merit for other reasons.
In Private Information Market, Harris and Mooney suggest that Article 9 be amended to
allow debtors to designate persons to act as private filing offices for particular debtors. Under
this proposal, states would license and regulate persons allowed to perform this function. Filings
made in the private filing office would have priority over filings made in the public filing office.
In contrast, the LOTL structure does not create a licensing mechanism and does not create two
competing information sources. Further, LOTL does not require an amendment to Article 9 to
implement. Though I prefer the efficiencies created by the LOTL structure for these reasons, the
Private Information Market suggestion is a good proposal that would have improved secured
financing and would enhance the certainty of the LOTL structure. Accordingly, the LOTL
strategy suggests that consideration should be given to an amendment to Article 9 to permit
debtors to designate private filing offices, though I would omit the licensing and registration
requirements. Also, I would consider making designation of the private filing office an exclusive
designation to eliminate the multiple information sources, and would treat any filing designated
as a "lien lord" filing, to be perpetual without the need for filing of continuation statements. See
Part V, infra.
81 The criteria would be established by the debtor and its financial advisor who design the
particular LOTL structure. The criteria might be based on financial measures or recognized
standing in an industry. Once secured parties opted to use the lien lord, the identity of the lien
lord would not be subject to change, except within the designated criteria, without the consent of
the secured parties served by the lien lord.
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transaction infrastructure deters entrenched lien lords from price
gouging, so limited numbers of transfers might be expected.
C. Financing Statements: Creditor Name
Section 9-502(a) of the UCC82 lists the elements that must be
contained in a financing statement. It states that a financing statement is
sufficient only if, among other things, it "provides the name of the
secured party or a representative of the secured party. 83 The concept of
a "representative of the secured party" is new to Revised Article 9. The
definition of "secured party" also has been revised to include within its
scope "a trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other
representative in whose favor a security interest or agricultural lien is
created or provided for."' 84 By way of this definition, we are given
examples of types of representatives, including the important
clarification that a collateral agent or indenture trustee may be a secured
party. Revised Article 9 makes clear that it is not even necessary to
indicate in the financing statement that the named secured party is
acting as a representative. 85 And, the underlying security interest can be
assigned to a new secured party without changing the secured party of
record.86 An unrecorded assignment of this type does not result in loss
of perfection. 87 These provisions validate the pre-revision practice of
using nominees as secured parties.
D. Financing Statements: Debtor Names
A creditor may file an initial financing statement that names more
than one debtor.88 The UCC includes this feature primarily to allow the
filing of a single initial financing statement against a husband and wife.
This feature also permits protective filings using debtor trade names to
enhance notice. However, the UCC does not limit the number of debtor
names that a creditor may index in a single initial financing statement.
These provisions clearly contemplate filings against multiple debtors
82 See U.C.C. § 9-502(a).
83 Id.
84 U.C.C. § 9-102(72).
85 See U.C.C. § 9-503(d).
86 See U.C.C. § 9-310(c).
87 Id. This clarification is consistent with prior case law, such as Rinn v. First Union Nat'l
Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401 (D. Md. 1995), in which successors to secured parties are treated as
themselves secured parties by operation of doctrines such as subrogation, even though the
successor failed to follow the proper procedures to perfect a security interest.
88 See U.C.C. § 9-503(e).
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and not merely filings against a marital unit or a single debtor that uses
multiple names. Official comments explain how a filing office may
properly reject a single initial financing statement with respect to one
named debtor while simultaneously accepting the same initial financing
statement with respect to another named debtor.89 Thus, a creditor may
file an initial financing statement that names all members of a
borrowing group.
The practice of making initial financing statement filings that
contain multiple debtor names confronts two fact patterns. In the first
fact pattern, all members of the borrowing group consist of "[r]egistered
organizations" 90 formed under the laws of a single jurisdiction.91 In this
instance, the single filing provides a one-stop procedure for both
perfection and notice. In the second fact pattern, the borrowing group
contains members that either are registered organizations formed under
the laws of several jurisdictions or are not registered organizations at
all. In this second case, creditors must make initial financing statement
filings in every jurisdiction (i) where a member is organized, if the
member is a registered organization, (ii) where a member maintains its
chief executive office, if it is a U.S. entity but not a registered
organization, or (iii) in the District of Columbia, if the member is
organized under the laws of a non-U.S. jurisdiction that itself does not
have a central filing system for security interests in personal property. 92
A filing in any given jurisdiction need only mention the debtor names
for the entities deemed located in that jurisdication. However, a creditor
might index additional names for borrowing group members located
elsewhere to enhance notice.
In current practice, the primary debtor makes representations and
warranties to the creditor as to the accuracy and completeness of a
schedule that purports to list all legal entities that comprise the
borrowing group (typically, corporate subsidiaries). The creditor then
uses this list to order searches and to prepare initial financing
statements. The creditor typically makes individual initial financing
statement filings separately against each individual legal entity in a
borrowing group rather than utilizing the ability to index multiple
debtor names in a single filing. If this practice changed, the most
efficient borrowing group structure would be one consisting entirely of
registered organizations formed under the laws of a single jurisdiction.
A borrowing group would enhance its ability to facilitate group wide
89 See U.C.C. § 9-520(d) cmt. 5.
90 "Registered organization" is defined at U.C.C. § 9-102(70). It includes domestic
corporations, but not foreign corporations.
91 Under section 9-307(e) of the UCC, all of these entities would be deemed located in the
jurisdiction of organization.
92 See U.C.C. § 9-307.
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security interest filings by forming or reincorporating all its domestic
entities as registered organizations under the laws of a single
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, filings including multiple debtor names
would reduce the total number of filings creditors make against
borrowing groups even if multiple jurisdictions remained relevant
within a borrowing group.
The LOTL strategy uses multiple indexing of debtor names in a
single initial financing statement wherever appropriate. To enhance
notice, these filings may index names of debtors located in other
jurisdictions. This procedure serves not only up-front efficiency but
also streamlines ongoing monitoring as creditors must file fewer
continuation statements. This reduces the occasion for error in
reproducing filing numbers in the continuation statements or
overlooking the filing of a financing statement altogether for a
particular debtor in the group.
A creditor may add debtor names to the initial financing statement
as the borrowing group acquires or forms new legal entities.93 A
creditor may delete debtor names from the financing statement as the
borrowing group liquidates or sells legal entities. In current secured
financing practice, the creditor relies on covenants of the primary debtor
or the borrowing group to promote receipt of notice of the correct legal
name and other particulars for legal entities added to the borrowing
group so that the creditor may make additional filings when appropriate
to add the new entity to the borrowing group.
A creditor might enhance the integrity of this system by requiring
the primary debtor or the borrowing group to deliver to the creditor a
certification from the borrowing group's accountants. The certification
would state that the accountants had compared the list of debtor names
in particular UCC filings supplied to the accountants by the lien lord
with the names of the legal entities whose consolidating financial
statements are included in the consolidated financial statements of the
borrowing group examined by the accountants. Further, the certification
would either state that the accountants found the two lists in agreement
or note any discrepancies discovered. Under the LOTL structure, intra-
group transfers (other than to foreign subsidiaries) pose no danger to the
93 One reason this practice has not developed may be the perception that it is better to file
separate financing statements for debtors who join a borrowing group rather than adding the new
names to an existing financing statement because adding a name to an existing financing
statement does not create any timing advantages for measuring the date of perfection. However,
adding a name by amendment to an existing financing statement does shorten the amount of time
that the financing statement is effective against the new debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-512 cmt. 4.
Though this observation is true, it fails to take account of the fact that the secured party will be
filing a continuation statement for the existing filings in any event and the practice of filing
separate financing statements merely multiplies the number of continuation statement filings and
the dates that must be monitored.
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creditors because no new perfection requirement will exist unless new
entities are identified through this procedure.
This LOTL strategy with respect to completeness of the debtor
name list supplements the traditional representation, warranty and
covenant procedure with third party validation of the list by auditors.
Deletions of debtor names from the UCC filings do not present a
monitoring problem because the debtor or borrowing group must
approach the creditor to request a deletion. Unilateral deletion by a
debtor would not be effective. 94 When confronted with a borrowing
group request for a deletion, the creditor or lead agent bank can
investigate the circumstances before consenting to the filing of the
amendment that deletes the name.
E. Financing Statements: Collateral Indication and Other Content
The UCC distinguishes between indication of collateral and
description of collateral. 95 A financing statement must indicate the
collateral whereas a security agreement must describe the collateral. A
description of collateral may serve as an indication of collateral but not
always the reverse. The key difference lies in the possibility of a
creditor using a supergeneric description as an indication of collateral
but not as a formal description of collateral. Following the Article 9
revisions, a financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it
simply states: "All assets of the debtor." 96
Use of such a super-generic description eliminates any real chance
of error in the financing statement. Even if the creditor intends to take a
security interest only in debtor equipment, for example, the
94 Though filing an unauthorized termination statement is not effective, see U.C.C. §§ 9-509,
9-510, such a filing nevertheless might result in the deletion of the financing statement from the
UCC filing office records because the filing office does not know that the filing of the termination
statement was unauthorized. One can imagine a UCC "terrorist" funded to file unauthorized
termination statements against filings made against the Russell 2000 companies or to facilitate
securitization transactions. It appears that the UCC filing office would only need to maintain a
record of the original filing against the debtor name for one year after the filing of the termination
statement. See U.C.C. § 9-513 cmt. 5. Such an "attack" against filed financing statements would
render a search of UCC filing offices even more meaningless as a source of notice than it is today.
See discussion infra Part III.G & accompanying notes. Potential secured parties would not even
know from whom they should seek information about the secured credit status of a debtor if the
public records were corrupted in such a fashion. In the LOTL strategy, with the name of the lien
lord otherwise publicized in a debtor's or borrowing group's financial statements, the ineffective
termination statement does not create undo harm to the notice function. The potential secured
party will obtain information from the lien lord regardless of whether the interest of the lien lord
is indexed properly in the filing system.
95 Compare U.C.C. § 9-108 (providing a description of collateral for security agreement),
with U.C.C. § 9-504 (providing an indication of collateral for financing statement).
96 See U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
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supergeneric description works in the financing statement. The
limitation of collateral to equipment occurs in the security agreement
where the granting clause is limited to equipment, either specifically
described or described generically by class. The debtor need not worry
that the generic description in the financing statement creates additional
rights in the creditor so long as the granting clause in the security
agreement is limited.97
The LOTL strategy with respect to collateral indication entails use
of a super-generic collateral description in the initial financing
statement.
The financing statement contains room for information in addition
to the indication of collateral. Including a statement to the following
effect in the financing statement will help preserve the integrity of the
structure.
Each debtor listed in this financing statement has granted X the
exclusive power and authority to file financing statements against it.
Further, each such debtor has covenanted and agreed with X not to
authorize or permit any other person to file a financing statement
against it. Any filing of a financing statement against any such
debtor that the debtor authorized or purports to have authorized
without the prior written consent of X constitutes an event of default
in agreements between each of the debtors and one or more creditors
for whom X is acting as secured party of record. Unauthorized filing
of a financing statement constitutes tortious interference with these
contracts.
Whatever one thinks about the debtor's ability to grant exclusive
authority to X to file financing statements, a filing including a legend
such as this should have the practical effect of limiting, if not
eliminating, the filing of additional financing statements against the
named debtors in voluntary secured credit transactions.
The debtor would covenant not to authorize or permit filing of
further financing statements. The subsequent public filing of a
financing statement against the debtor would be evidence that the debtor
violated its contractual commitment not to authorize or permit the filing
of further financing statements. The possibility of highly visible
defaults on existing debt agreements for this covenant breach would
help to police the arrangement.98
97 See U.C.C. § 9-510 cmt. 2, ex. 1.
98 Doubt has been expressed over the ability of a debtor to contract away its right to obtain
purchase money financing on a priority secured basis. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 76, at
1173 n.97 (noting that "the priority afforded purchase money lenders does not appear to be
subject to private contractual modification-at least in a way that would bind third parties").
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F. Security Agreement
The LOTL structure would rely on a core short form security
agreement99 pursuant to which each member of the borrowing group
creates a security interest in the defined "collateral" in favor of the lien
lord to secure repayment of the defined "secured obligations." The
security agreement would contain a comprehensive definition of
collateral covering all personal property of the debtor. To be effective,
the collateral description would individually list all asset types covered
by the UCC, as well as excluded asset types. 00 "Collateral" would
expressly include after-acquired property and proceeds. 10 1  The
definition of secured obligation would include an initial $1,000 advance
made by the lien lord, together with all other obligations described in
supplemental financing agreements of lenders for whom the lien lord
has agreed to act as secured party representative. In all cases, secured
obligations would be defined to include costs and expenses of
collection, as well as attorney fees. 02 The focus of the core short form
security agreement is to contain the essential terms needed to create the
secured credit relationship in a format that needs little review and
covers items that, though essential, might inadvertently be dropped in
the preparation and negotiation of a much longer document. 03
99 The UCC defines a security agreement simply as any "agreement that creates or provides
for a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-102(73).
100 The UCC expressly sanctions description of collateral by asset type. See U.C.C. § 9-108.
Various examples of comprehensive granting clauses exist, including some prepared by persons
involved in the Article 9 revision process. See Steven 0. Weise, A Comparison of a Security
Agreement Under the Former Article 9 and the New Article 9 (Apr. 1, 2000), available at
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/00052/005145.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
101 The UCC allows a security interest to extend to after-acquired collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-
204. Generally, specific mention of after-acquired collateral must be made in the security
agreement for this coverage. For certain assets types, however, such as inventory and accounts,
case law has not required specific mention. A security interest continues in proceeds whether or
not the security agreement mentions that proceeds are covered. See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2). Use of
a standard and comprehensive granting clause would reduce risks of ambiguity or mistake. See,
e.g., Shelby County State Bank v. Van Diest Supply Co., 303 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding a
failure of a granting clause to cover after-acquired property). A failure of contract scope would
not likely be covered by an insurance policy because the scope of collateral coverage is a matter
of intent, not a failed procedure.
102 Such inclusion takes advantage of the UCC provisions that provide for the application of
proceeds of collateral to pay reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred by the
secured party to the extent provided by agreement and not prohibited by law. See, e.g., U.C.C. §
9-615(a)(1).
103 In practice, I encountered many drafting horribles, such as "secured" trust indentures that
omitted such essentials as granting clauses, though containing wonderful procedures for
conducting meetings of bondholders. The LOTL strategy would reduce the frequency of such
exciting events by providing basic structure in easy to perceive relief and then omitting the errors
caused by word processing and similar mistakes as procedures are replicated on a transaction by
transaction basis.
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A particular LOTL structure might require that all secured parties
share a single core security agreement. Alternately, multiple security
agreements might be used, each incorporating the core short form, with
different creditor groups supplementing the core in different ways. Use
of multiple security agreements might be preferred if a debtor and its
financial advisors desired to provide creditors who had different priority
levels with different individual liens. 104 Particular creditors or creditor
groups might attach riders to the core short form expressly disclaiming
security in certain assets, or limiting their security interest only to
specified assets or asset classes. In cases where multiple creditors share
a single security interest but different priority levels are desired, the
public priority would be created for the lien lord generally against the
world, with the desired priorities among the individual creditors created
internally by intercreditor arrangements or specified rules (such as first
to record with the lien lord has priority over later recorded interests).
Such internal rules are part of every securitization transaction.
The tremendous flexibility afforded to the treatment of security
agreements comes from the lack of linkage under the UCC between a
financing statement and a security agreement. One financing statement
can be used to perfect security interests created pursuant to multiple
security agreements, including security agreements that were not even
contemplated at the time of the original finacing statement filing. There
is no requirement that a financing statement service only a single
transaction or series of transactions that are related in some way.
G. Bank Accounts and Security Accounts
The recent amendments to Article 9 included deposit accounts as a
type of collateral subject to perfection under Article 9.105 Previously,
perfection of a security interest in deposit accounts as original collateral
had been excluded from the scope of most state's versions of the
UCC106 and, accordingly, secured parties had to rely on less certain
procedures gleaned from case law. 107 Though the amendments provided
104 Such a desire to use separate security agreements might arise as a means to provide for
post-petition interest to a senior lender. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, 134 B.R. 528 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991). Such matters similarly can be addressed with contract provisions.
105 A secured party may obtain control over deposit account. See U.C.C. § 9-104. Obtaining
control over a deposit account is the exclusive method of perfecting a security interest in this
asset type as original collateral and not proceeds. See U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1).
106 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-104(1) (1972) (New York) (excluding deposit accounts from the scope
of Article 9). California and Illinois were two states that included deposit accounts in coverage
under the UCC. See Jason M. Ban, Deposit Accounts: An Article 9 Security Interest, 17 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 493, 497 (1998) (listing states that included deposit accounts as Article 9
collateral prior to the revisions).
107 See, e.g., Gerald T. McLaughlin, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts: Unresolved
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welcome certainty, the specified method of perfection was limited to the
secured party obtaining "control" over the deposit account.1 08 Filing a
financing statement was not made an option. This choice differs from
the choice made with respect to security accounts, a similar type of
collateral, for which both control and filing a financing statement are
options.10 9 Thus, to implement the LOTL structure with respect to bank
accounts, the lien lord must appear as a party to a three-party control
agreement among the debtor/account owner, the bank at which the
account is maintained and the lien lord. The debtor might simply
arrange for the signing of a control agreement naming the lien lord each
time it opens a new account. When the debtor obtains secured financing
backed by a blanket lien on all assets, the control agreements obtained
for existing accounts may continue in effect beyond the particular
financing and be used in future financings. In practice, often it is
difficult to obtain control agreements from all of a debtor's or
borrowing group's banks in a timely fashion, though such agreements
usually are forthcoming in the fullness of time. The lien lord's pre-
existing perfected interest in bank accounts would significantly reduce
the time needed to complete a secured financing using all assets of a
debtor as collateral.
Though not required for perfection, the debtor could provide
similar comfort for secured parties by following a similar procedure
with respect to security accounts.
Registering bank accounts and security accounts with the lien lord
has an added monitoring benefit. In the recently uncovered Parmalat
fraud, 10 the debtor apparently created false records for a non-existent
bank account and security account. The accountants did not uncover
the fraud and non-existent assets were reported on the debtor's balance
sheet. If a debtor had a policy of subjecting all its bank accounts and
security accounts to the control of a lien lord, the accountants could
check the list of covered accounts at the lien lord against the list of
accounts included as assets in the balance sheets subject to audit. The
Problems and Unanswered Questions Under Existing Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 45, 60-75 (1988)
(describing common law procedures for perfecting a security interest in a deposit account).
108 See supra note 105. This limitation for bank accounts has been criticized. See ROBERT L.
JORDAN ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW 213-14 (5th ed. 2001). The LOTL strategy would similarly
criticize this limitation as it adds a procedure to the perfection process that would not be required
by many secured creditors if filing were an option, as it is in the case of security accounts. For a
description of the new procedures to perfect a security interest in a deposit account, see Ben
Carpenter, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts and Certificates of Deposit Under Revised UCC
Article 9, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 133 (2001).
109 A security account is a form of investment property. A security interest may be perfected
against investment property by filing a financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-312(a). Also, a
security interest in a security account may be perfected by control. See U.C.C. § 9-314.
110 See Alessandra Galloni et al., Scope of Scandal at Parmalat Widens to More Than $8
Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at Al.
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extent to which a debtor honors its promise to the lien lord to subject all
accounts to the collateral package would provide a signal as the extent
to which the debtor had procedures in place to manage and monitor its
own assets.
H. Other Filing Systems
The lien lord's role would not be limited, however, to mere
appearance on a UCC financing statement and in a security agreement,
and maintenance of a record of secured lenders. In principle, the lien
lord name could be inserted into the various registry and title systems
for real estate, vehicles, intellectual property, railcars, insurance
policies, aircraft, and so forth, as a matter of course, so that the required
forms of public notice are pre-positioned for any possible secured
financing. Such a strategy would work best in legal structures that, like
the Uniform Commercial Code, permit lien inflation' I (i.e., future
advances) and subject newly acquired debtor assets to after-acquired
property clauses.
Debtors would reap fewer benefits from using the LOTL structure
in recording systems designed to raise revenue through fees based on
the amount of a secured financing, such as those found in the real estate
laws of many states.' 12 The non-exhaustive outline below indicates
some of the other procedures that need to be followed to implement the
LOTL structure for non-UCC covered asset types. The costs and
benefits of implementing the LOTL structure vary by asset type and
jurisdiction. The summary does, however, indicate those types of
structures that facilitate financing in contrast to those that make creation
of transaction infrastructure problematic.
I. Property Subject to Certificate of Title Statutes
The UCC excludes from its scope perfection of security interests in
111 See Harry M. Flechtner, Inflatable Liens and Like Phenomena: Converting Unsecured
Debt Under U C.C. Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 715-16 (1987)
[hereinafter Flechtner, Inflatable Liens],
112 For example, some states have flat fees for recording mortgages on real property. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4-4.1 (West 2003); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 118.011 (Vernon 2003).
Other states' fees vary in proportion to the value of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage.
See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 253 (McKinney 2003); MINN. STAT. § 287.035 (2003).
Unfortunately, a few states use the UCC filing system to raise revenue in a similar fashion,
creating practical problems for financing by businesses with entities organized under the laws of
those states. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 67.409(b) (2003).
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vehicles and other assets subject to certificate of title laws. 113 The
LOTL strategy should work well for vehicles and other property subject
to certificate of title statutes. Recent case law confirms that the notation
of secured party names on title certificates merely serves to put third
parties who would examine the title certificates on inquiry notice that a
secured party claims an interest in the vehicle. " 4 It is not important that
the name of the actual secured party appear on the certificate so long as
a name appears from whom third parties might ascertain the status of
secured claims against the vehicle. Thus, notation of the lien lord on
certificates of title should suffice to create perfected security interests,
even though the lien lord is acting as a nominee for others.
Certain securitization transactions provide an example of a
concrete benefit that the LOTL strategy might provide.
Parties such as automobile manufacturers and leasing companies
have developed transaction infrastructure known as "titling trusts" to
facilitate securitization financing for fleets of leased vehicles. Such
transactions involve the re-titling of ownership of leased vehicles into
special purpose trusts to isolate the assets from the bankruptcy estate of
the transaction originator. However, no security interest is noted on the
vehicles' titles. The weakness of the structure lies in the fact that
certain liabilities, most notably pension liabilities, do not stop at the
discrete legal entity level but instead extend to all entities in a controlled
group. 115
Thus, it is possible that, if the securitization transaction sponsors
have unfunded pension liabilities and then file for bankruptcy, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation might seek a priority claim
against the assets held in the titling trust, including both the vehicles and
the leases. 116 The use of the LOTL structure might be used by such
enterprises, as well as by enterprises that do not have such
concentrations of asset value in vehicles, if, as a matter of course, all
newly acquired vehicles contained a title certificate notation listing the
lien lord as a secured party at the time the original title certificate was
113 See U.C.C. § 9-311. This would typically include ships that are not registered with the
federal authorities or under the laws of another country. See infra notes at 140-43 and
accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., In re Wuerzberger, 284 B.R. 814 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002) (analyzing notation on
certificate of title to mobile home).
115 A variety of such entity piercing laws are discussed in BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL
CHALLENGE, supra note 20. This phenomenon of entity piercing laws illustrates one type of
circumstance in which security interests act as a more protective method of asset partitioning than
legal entities.
116 See The PBGC, The Fourth Horseman of the Apocalypse, Asset-Backed Update, Harris &
Nesbitt (June 2003) (describing titling trusts and the risks presented by claims of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation to lease securitization transactions), available at
http://www.harrisnesbitt.com/securitization/usa/marketnewsletter/images/getFile.asp?ContentD=
2715&FilelD = 1753 (last visited Feb. 27, 2004)
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issued. 117 In the case of a lease securitization in which the investors
hold senior equity interests in the trust rather than debt investments, the
security interest might secure an indemnity obligation holding investors
in the lease securitization harmless against loss from specified
liabilities, such as those relating to pensions. Over time, use of the
LOTL strategy would result in all of a firm's vehicles becoming easily
available as collateral for secured financings.
J. Insurance Policies
Article 9 of the UCC excludes perfection of security interests in
insurance policies from its scope. 1 8 Use of the LOTL structure would
make creation of security interests in insurance policies easier.
Typically, a secured party has three choices for insurance policies. In
the first option, the secured party obtains status as a "certificate holder"
of the policy. This status entitles the secured party to receive prior
notice of any cancellation of the policy so that it may protect itself by
paying a policy premium if the debtor fails to do so. It does not give the
secured party a priority status in the policy or payments thereunder. In
the second option, the secured party obtains the status of either an
"additional insured" or a "loss payee." This status entitles the secured
party to a priority interest in payments made under the policy, as well as
giving the secured party an enhanced element of control over the use of
insurance proceeds. This is the most common form of protection taken
by secured parties. In the third option, the secured party obtains a
"lender loss payable" clause on its policy. This clause entitles the
secured party to receive payment under the policy even if some act by
117 The current version of the UCC takes a modest step in the direction of efficiency by
providing that a security interest in vehicles subject to certificate of title statutes generally will, in
the case of motor vehicles held as inventory by a person in the business of selling goods of this
kind, be perfected by filing financing statements rather than notification on a certificate of title.
See U.C.C. § 9-311(d). This provision does not, however, cover companies that are in the
business of leasing, but not selling. See U.C.C. § 9-311 cmt. 4. Thus, the convenience of
financing statement filing is not available for a typical lease securitization in which the leasing
activities have been isolated in a special purpose subsidiary to separate those assets from the
bankruptcy estate of the manufacturer of the vehicles. The LOTL strategy would suggest that a
security interest in all vehicles should be capable of perfection by filing a financing statement,
with the simple proviso that a bona fide purchaser would take free of the interest unless it were
noted on the certificate of title.
118 See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(8). This exclusion generally applies to security interests in
insurance policies as original collateral. Payments received by debtors under insurance policies
for loss suffered to collateral constitute proceeds of the collateral and are covered under the UCC.
See U.C.C. § 9-102(64). But see CAL. COM. CODE § 9109 cmt. 13 (2004) (including insurance as
original collateral under California UCC), Even in cases where UCC coverage is provided,
however, secured lenders prefer following additional procedures so that they might monitor the
policy to prevent unexpected cancellation for failure to pay premiums and to control the use of
the proceeds should a payment be made.
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the debtor would provide a defense to payment of the debtor for the
insurance company. In effect, the lender loss payable clause gives the
secured party a direct contract claim against the insurance company for
loss up to the amount of the loan; with the clause, the secured party does
not merely stand in the shoes of the debtor.
In most cases of inventory and equipment insurance, insurance
companies do not impose an additional charge for these endorsements.
In the case of large cost items, such as aircraft and marine insurance, an
additional charge may be imposed for the equivalent of a lender loss
payable clause (often known as a "breach of warranty" rider in this
context).
In transaction practice, it often takes several weeks and some
limited negotiation with insurance company counsel to insert the name
of a secured party or collateral agent into a debtor's insurance policies.
The use of the LOTL structure reduces costs in this procedure if the
name of the lien lord simply is inserted when the policy is obtained or
when the next secured financing is completed. Further, secured parties
may benefit from the original delegation without the need to repeat
steps on a transaction by transaction basis to obtain a security interest in
the insurance policy for future secured loans.
K. Intellectual Property
Obtaining and perfecting security interests in intellectual property
is famously convoluted. Under current case law, UCC filings appear
sufficient to perfect security interests in patents and trademarks owned
by a debtor." 9 However, a secured party must make a federal filing to
perfect a security interest in a federally registered copyright. 120 Recent
case law has found that a UCC filing is sufficient to perfect a security
interest in an unregistered copyright. 121 Thus, the LOTL structure might
be used to insert the name of the lien lord into federal copyright records
to notice security interests in those assets. The real financing problem
presented by copyrights, however, is caused by the antiquated Federal
copyright registration system which does not provide an easy
mechanism for recording interests in after-acquired copyrights on a
119 See In re Cybernetic Serv. Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 919-21 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
a UCC filing is sufficient to perfect a security interest in patents); TriMarchi v. Together Dev.
Corp., 255 B.R. 606, 610-12 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding that the Lanham Act's registration
provisions do not preempt the state filing of a security interest under the UCC).
120 In re Peregrine Entm't Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990). Filing fees for the
federal registry are eighty dollars per title and twenty dollars per additional group of ten titles.
See 37 C.F.R. § 201.03(c) (2003).
121 In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002); cf In re Chattanooga
Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (analyzing service marks).
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blanket basis. Each registration of a security interest must be done on a
copyright by copyright basis.122 If a debtor noted the lien lord's interest
as a matter of course each time it registered a federal copyright, it would
have qualified all of its federally registered copyrights for use as
collateral in secured financings. A debtor might notice the lien lord's
interest against its existing federally registered copyrights at the time of
a significant secured financing and would not, thereafter, need to make
similar filings for future financings.
As a matter of secured financing practice, lenders often require
filings with the Patent and Trademark Office to reflect security interests
in patents and trademarks 2 3 even though case law suggests that such
filings are not necessary to provide protection against a bankruptcy
trustee.1 24 Though such an approach raises certain other issues for
protection of the debtor's rights in these items of intellectual
property, 2 5 if desired by the parties, the name of the lien lord might be
pre-positioned in these records as well.
In many cases, debtors do not own the intellectual property that
they use. Instead, debtors license the use of intellectual property from
third party owners/licensors. Often, the license prohibits assignment of
the licensee's rights to use the intellectual property. Further, existing
law often creates a presumption in favor of the licensor that the licensee
may not assign the rights to its licensee position. 26 The LOTL structure
122 Collateral must be specifically described by title or registration number, 17 U.S.C.A, §
205(c) (2003), inhibiting financing of after-acquired property. Various proposals, including
legislation, have been advanced to correct these well known problems. It is rumored that major
film studios lobbied to block legislation that would improve the system for recording security
interests against registered copyrights. The motivation was to deprive independent film makers
of a source of financing. Fewer independent films means less competition for the established
studios who are able to obtain financing under the current less than ideal recording system.
123 See JORDAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 459-61.
124 See supra note 119.
125 The belts and suspenders approach of making both UCC filings and federal filings against
intellectual property may not always be wise. An example of a risk that may be caused by simply
recording an assignment of intellectual property with the PTO as part of a secured transaction is
contained in The Clorox Co. v. Chem. Bank, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1098 (TTAB 1996). In that case a
security interest was created in an "intent-to-use" application for which no Statement of Use had
been filed. In form, the security agreement purported to assign and transfer to Chemical Bank all
of a debtor's rights in specified trademarks, including an "intent-to-use" application to register the
mark "SUPER SCRUB." The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board determined that, even though
the debtor and bank intended to create a security interest in the "intent-to-use" application, the
assignment was an "outright, rather than conditional, assignment of all right, title and interest in
and to the specific trademarks which USA Detergents Inc. warranted to own .. " Because
section 10 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1060, prohibits an assignment of an intent-to-use
application prior to the filing of a Statement of Use, the assignment voided not only the
application but the registration of the trademark.
126 Everex Sys, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (sustaining licensor
objection to licensee assignment of non-exclusive patent license); Harris v. Emus Records Corp.,
734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1994) (sustaining objection to assignment of copyright license); see also
In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). In Insitute Pasteur v.
Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2511 (1997), the
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suggests a way forward for debtors who would like the option of
offering licensee rights to secured parties as collateral, but it imposes
certain upfront contracting costs. 127 The problem is not raised by the
recording system, as such. Rather, the problem is the potential value of
the collateral.
Following the LOTL strategy of pre-positioning assets for secured
financing, a debtor might negotiate an assignment of its licensee rights
with the licensor to the lien lord at the time the license is obtained. If
this assignment expressly stated that its purpose was to create priority in
the proceeds realized from the transfer of the licensee rights but at the
same time reserved to the licensor all rights that it may have under other
law to determine the identity and suitability of the transferee (but
without the right to forbid transfers altogether), the licensor should have
little reason to object to the provision. If use of the LOTL structure
became commonplace, the costs of explaining and negotiating for such
a provision could be expect to decline. A similar approach to security
interests is taken in the case of certain regulated licenses.
L. Regulated Licenses
Perfection of security interests in regulated licenses involves a
patchwork of approaches and procedures that may be illustrated by a
few examples, such as FCC licenses, liquor licenses and commercial
fishing licenses. Unfortunately, treatment of any individual license will
be sui generis to its particular regulatory scheme and must be
investigated on a case by case basis. In certain cases, UCC filings are
used (with more or less effect), in others filing must be made with a
regulatory agency and, in some cases, no form of security interest is
possible.
FCC licenses are a particularly valuable asset type in which a
secured party may not perfect a security interest. After much confusion
in situations in which secured parties attempted to perfect security
interests in FCC licenses by filing UCC financing statements, the FCC
and case law arrived at a compromise. Though no security interest may
be taken in the license itself, a financing statement may be filed to
perfect a security interest in any proceeds realized from the sale or
First Circuit Court of Appeals permitted a debtor to avoid the Everex assignment prohibition by
transferring the equity interest in the entity that had assumed the license. Case law even
suggested that a debtor in bankruptcy may not assume its position as licensee under a non-
exclusive patent license. In re Catapult Entm't, 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999).
127 The practical problem is not that the filing of a UCC financing statement fails to perfect a
security interest in the licensee rights, including any proceeds from the transfer of the licensee
position. Rather, the problem is that there never will be any proceeds from such a transfer
because the licensor has the right to prohibit transfers.
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transfer of the license.] 28
The compromise gives the regulatory authority the assurance that it
wants: the creation of the security interest in the license will not result
in loss of control by the regulator over the identity and suitability of
transferees of the license who might acquire the license pursuant to
exercise of remedies by the secured party. Also, the compromise
appears to give the secured party what it wants most: the ability to apply
value realized from the sale of the asset to repayment of debt. Though it
would be better for the secured party to be able to transfer the license
without the need for regulatory approval, given the nature of the
property there is not much alternative but to accept regulatory approval
as a condition to transfer. Similar need for regulatory approval often
exists under antitrust laws anytime a sufficiently valuable asset is sold,
so the need for regulatory approval is not as unusual as it might seem at
first blush. 129
The favorable aspect of the compromise is that the filing of a UCC
financing statement suffices to perfect the security interest in the FCC
broadcast license proceeds. The unfavorable aspect of the compromise
is that it creates a preference risk or worse for the secured lender. One
structural truth is that the proceeds of the license do not exist as debtor
property until the license is sold. A security interest in these proceeds
thus cannot attach until the sale. 130 A sale that occurs shortly before a
bankruptcy filing will result in delayed attachment of the security
interest, a classic transfer in respect of antecedent debt.' 31 A sale after a
bankruptcy filing will not generate assets to which a security interest
128 The FCC prohibits an FCC licensee from giving a security interest in the license itself for
public policy reasons. In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829, 830-31 (1983). However, the FCC and
case law have determined that a lender can hold a valid security interest in the proceeds of the
sale of a broadcast license. See In re Walter Cheksey, 9 F.C.C.R. 986 (1994); Orix Credit
Alliance, Inc. v. Mills (In re Beach Television Partners), 38 F.3d 535 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Howard Comm. Corp., 980 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1992); State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Arrow Comm., 833 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1993); PBR
Communications Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson Bank (In re PBR Communications Systems, Inc.),
172 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994); In re Thomas Communications, 166 B.R. 846 (Bankr.
S.D.W.V. 1994).
129 See 16 C.F.R. § 802.63 (2000) (providing that acquisition of collateral by a bona fide
creditor in a foreclosure is exempt from reporting requirements of Hart-Scott-Rodino, but sale of
same collateral to a third party may not be exempt).
130 U.C.C. § 9-203. Currently, courts seem to be ignoring the structural problem posed by
granting a current security interest in assets, such as proceeds, that do not exist; however, there is
no assurance that courts will ignore the problem for all types of regulatory collateral on a
prospective basis. Compare Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest In Non-Assignable
Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 323, 347-48 (2001) (collecting
cases in which courts find proceeds of licenses to not constitute after-acquired property), with
Edwin E. Smith, Article 9 in Revision: A Proposal for Permitting Security Interests in
Nonassignable Contracts and Permits, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 335, 344 (1994) (noting problems
with creating a present security interest in proceeds that do not exist).
131 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2003).
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may attach. This is because a security interest may not attach to
property acquired by a debtor post-petition unless the post-petition
property represents proceeds of pre-petition property in which the
debtor had granted the secured party a perfected security interest.32
This favorable situation for post-petition proceeds does not exist in the
case of the FCC broadcast license because the law does not permit a
secured party to have a security interest in the FCC license itself
Though the regulatory regime does not prevent creation of a
security interest in the name of a lien lord in the proceeds of the license
using a UCC filing, regulatory confusion has created a serious risk.
Where a regulatory authority confuses permission to grant a security
interest with loss of control over the ability of the regulatory authority
to approve transferees of the regulated property, either preference risk
or the risk of no security is created. Properly analyzed, the permission
to grant a security interest need not result in loss of approval rights by
the regulator over the party who acquires the asset in any foreclosure
proceeding. This regulatory problem, however, is not caused by the
LOTL structure. The lien lord has the same advantages and
disadvantages as other creditors. 133
In the case of liquor licenses, different jurisdictions have different
rules. At one extreme, California provides an example in which it is not
possible to perfect a security interest in a liquor license. 34 Florida
provides an example in which it is possible to perfect a security interest
in a liquor license by filing with the regulatory authority rather than
filing a financing statement.135 The name of a lien lord may be inserted
into the records of the Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco in the same manner as the name of the lien lord is inserted into
the UCC records. Pre-positioning of security interests in liquor
132 See id. § 552.
133 An ideal structure to implement the LOTL strategy would be for every regulatory agency
to permit a simple UCC filing to perfect a security interest in regulatory property of any type of
license or concession subject to its jurisdiction. However, where a regulator desires control and
approval rights over potential transferees of the license or concession, the regulator would retain
the right to approve any person who would acquire the asset by exercise of remedies by the
secured party or in a transfer following an insolvency of the debtor. The only cases in which such
a structure becomes complicated are cases in which the regulator wishes to approve the
substantive terms of secured financing obtained by its licensees. Such regulatory oversight would
be better accomplished by direct operating restrictions on the regulated businesses, rather than by
indirectly managing the process by creating alternate property procedures for creation of security
interests.
134 The California Business and Professions Code, section 24074, contains the exclusive
remedy for creditors seeking proceeds of the transfer of a liquor license. See Grover Escrow
Corp. v. Gole, 453 P.2d 461 (Cal. 1969). Section 24074 requires that creditors be paid pro rata
from proceeds of a liquor license. Thus, an attempt to obtain a priority in these proceeds by means
of a security interest likely would be ineffective.
135 See Fla. Stat., § 561.65(4); see also Dery v. Occhiuzzo & Occhiuzzo Enter., Inc. 771 So. 2d
1276 (Fla. App. 2000).
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licenses, where permitted, might be a valuable tool for restaurant chains
to facilitate various financings.
Commercial fishing licenses illustrate a potential trap for the
unwary. A commercial fishing license would appear to constitute
intangible personal property that would be subject to the UCC
perfection procedures in the absence of an alternate regulatory filing
system. There is no federal law expressly providing for the registration
of security interests against federal commercial fishing permits. Case
law has held, however, that a federal commercial fishing permit, even
though intangible, is property appurtenant to the commercial fishing
vessel. 36 Thus, the federal fishing permit is subject to maritime liens
asserted against the vessel. This logic, if followed to its conclusion,
would suggest that a preferred ship mortgage should be used to perfect a
security interest in a commercial fishing permit.
M. Aircraft, Railroad Equipment & Ships
Perfection of security interests in aircraft, 137 railroad equipment 138
and ships 139 generally requires federal filings because federal law
contains registration systems that provide for recordation of security
interests. These federal laws preempt the UCC filing system. 40  In
principle, these recordation systems do not present material obstacles to
136 See Gowen Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d 64 (1st Cit. 2001) (asserting maritime lien to
recover for wharfage and repairs under the Federal Maritime Lien Act imposing a maritime lien
for debts owed to pay necessaries furnished to a vessel).
137 See, e.g., Danning v. Pac. Propeller, Inc. (In re Holiday Airlines Corp.), 620 F.2d 731 (9th
Cir. 1980). The controlling provisions of the Federal Aviation Act are 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107-11.
Federal law provides for the filing of mortgages against aircraft, propellers, aircraft engines,
appliances and spare parts. The basic filing fee is five dollars. 14 C.F.R. § 49.15 (2003). The
property subject to the mortgage must be specifically described.
138 A secured lender perfects a security interest in locomotives, railcars and other railroad
equipment by recording a lien at the Surface Transportation Board. See 49 U.S.C. § 11301
(2002). Security interest filings against tow boats, barges and other watercraft subject to Surface
Transportation Board authority also are made at the Surface Transportation Board. Filings may
cover after-acquired property and are subject to a thirty dollar per document filing fee.
139 The controlling provisions are a codification of the Ship Mortgage Act at 46 U.S.C. §§
31321-30. Liens on ships operate from the perspective that the ship itself is a legal entity
obligated on the debt or other liability, creating added complexity to this area of the law. In
general, maritime liens arise from maritime transactions and torts without recordation. The
recording of a preferred ship mortgage with the United States Coast Guard is an exception in
which filing is required. Generally, if a ship is under twenty-five feet in length, a security interest
in the vessel is perfected under state certificate of title statutes similar to the procedures followed
for an automobile. If the ship is five net tons (generally a ship of more than twenty-five feet in
length), federal recordation is available. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (expressing eligibility for
federal registration in terms of five net ton minimum).
140 U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(1). If a ship is not registered with the United States Coast Guard or
under the flag of another nation, perfection of a security interest in the ship would be governed by
a state certificate of title statute.
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implementation of the LOTL structure. 141 In practice, however, the
LOTL structure should not be expected to add as much value for these
asset types as for others. This is because often the financings for
expensive assets such as these are accomplished in leverage lease and
similar transactions 42 in which a complicated ownership structure is
developed so that third party investors, other than the debtor/operator of
the assets, is the owner of the assets for tax purposes. This allows the
investor/owner of the assets to take advantage of current depreciation on
the assets that the debtor/operator may be unable to use. In general
outline, the rules governing ship mortgages can result in priority on a
last-in-time / first-in-right basis so that certainty of priority is
compromised. 143
Overall, debtors may avail themselves of pre-positioning
opportunities for assets of these types subject to federal regulation, but
the LOTL structure is not primarily directed at them.
N. Real Estate Assets
Debtors either own real estate or lease it from third parties. In the
case of owned real estate, the LOTL structure is easily implemented by
filing a deed of trust or mortgage in the name of the lien lord. The value
of this procedure is greatest in states that do not raise revenue by
charging a mortgage recording tax. 144 In those states, a debtor may pre-
position the lien lord to facilitate future extensions of secured credit
without worry over subsequent procedures. In states that do charge a
mortgage recording tax based on the amount of the debt secured, pre-
141 Some adjustments might be required. For example, the Ship Mortage Act allows a secured
party to secure a contingent obligation, though it requires listing of a specific dollar amount. The
fee, however, is a mere four dollars per filed page. 46 C.F.R. §§ 67.529, 67.550 (2003). In the
LOTL structure, the value of the vessel might be listed. In any event, future advances may be
secured by a ship mortgage which facilitates the LOTL structure. Often, vessels are registered
under the laws of foreign jurisdictions, such as Liberia, the Cayman Islands or the Marshall
Islands. In the case of the Marshall Islands, the laws are patterned on the corporation laws of
Delaware and the United States Ship Mortgage Act. The similarity to known legal regimes
facilitates financing. The managers of the Marshall Islands ship registration system came from
Liberia where they conducted similar operations.
142 For example, the operator of a ship might either lease or charter the ship, rather than own
it. The high value of these assets already supports financing through large syndicates of lenders
so that the efficiency gains largely may be realized without the LOTL structure.
143 See Bank One Louisiana N.A. v. M/V Mr. Dean, 293 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
a later perfected claim for breach of a charter contract had priority over an earlier filed and
perfected preferred ship mortgage because the charter contract existed prior to the mortgage and,
thus, the claim under the charter contract was deemed to arise at that time).
144 Compare N.Y. TAX LAW § 253 (McKinney 2003) (specifying that New York state
mortgage recording tax is computed based on amount of mortgage debt), with N.J. STAT. ANN. §
4-4.1 (West 2003) (specifying that New Jersey mortgage recording tax is set at a flat fee unrelated
to amount of debt secured).
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positioning may have some advantages but the value of the procedure is
significantly reduced as further taxes and subsequent filings in the real
estate records will be required at the time material credit is extended or
refinanced.
In the case of leased real estate, the world divides between short-
term space leases that typically have little value and often are not
recorded in the real estate records in the first place and long-term leases
with potentially significant value that are recorded in the real estate
records to protect the lessee's position. In the later case, it is typical for
the debtor/lessee to worry about its ability to use its leasehold estate as
collateral. With this possibility in mind, the lessee typical negotiates
notice and cure rights with the lessor pursuant to which the lessor agrees
to give any leasehold mortgagee notice of defaults under the lease and
the ability to cure those defaults. Such a provision typically is
negotiated even if no current financing of the leasehold estate is
contemplated. The provision affords the leasehold mortgagee the
ability to protect the value of its collateral in case of defaults by the
lessee. In the context of such a negotiation, it adds zero cost to
designate the name of the lien lord as the secured party. Whether such a
designation offers material savings will again depend on whether the
applicable state law charges a tax based on the amount of the debt
secured by the leasehold mortgage.
0. Knitting the Secured Guarantee Web
To start the process of constructing the guarantee web, the lien lord
loans the debtor $1,000, the debtor signs a security agreement 145 naming
the lien lord as representative of secured parties and the lien lord files a
financing statement indicating that the collateral consists of "all assets
of the debtor."' 46 The description of collateral contained in the security
agreement is made by type reference to asset classes 47 and includes all
assets in which a security interest may be created under Revised Article
9. Additionally, the security agreement collateral description may
include references to asset types excluded from the scope of Article 9.148
The collateral description in the security agreement expressly covers
after-acquired property. The description of secured obligations in the
security agreement includes both the $1,000 loan and all future
145 The debtor is required to authenticate the security agreement, though the secured party is
not. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(a).
146 The super generic description of collateral is permitted in the financing statement. U.C.C. §
9-504.
147 Description of collateral by asset type is permitted in the security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-
108(b) cmt. 2.
148 Examples of such collateral include copyrights.
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advances of any party for whom the lien lord acts as representative. A
post-filing search of the UCC filing office is made. This search reflects
the filing made in the name of the lien lord and, ideally, the absence of
other UCC filings. A legal opinion is rendered confirming the
perfection and priority of the security interest. In the case of a
borrowing group, all members of the group guarantee the $1,000 loan
and all future advances. They grant security interests to secure their
guarantees. 149
A debtor may take these steps prior to any specific plans to obtain
significant secured financing from lenders. The token $1,000 advance
preserves the integrity of the initial filing of the financing statement.
Without such an advance, the debtor could require that the secured party
file a termination statement. °50 For good measure, the $1,000 advance
is expressly not pre-payable and has a maturity date far in the future.
Creditors that make advances relying on the presence of this "golden"
financing statement want to be confident that, once the lien lord has
agreed to act for them, the financing statement on which they are
relying has not been terminated at a time when no advances or
commitments are in place. With the token advance outstanding, the
debtor cannot cause the filing of a termination statement.
A loan document evidencing the $1,000 advance is styled the
"master advance agreement." The definition of "secured obligations" in
the security agreement includes "all present and future advances,
including principal, interest and fees made pursuant to the master
advance agreement, as it may be amended, modified and supplemented
from time to time." Provision also is made to secure various costs and
expenses, including legal fees. The master advance agreement provides
that various lenders, trustees and other financiers may become parties to
the master advance agreement and incorporate by reference into that
master agreement their various individual financing agreements
separately negotiated with the debtor.
149 A simple form of guarantee is used. It might include standard provisions recommended by
the rating agencies. See Sample Guarantee Language, Appendix V, in Legal Criteria for
Structured Finance Transactions, STANDARD & POOR'S, Apr. 2002, available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/Legal2OO2.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2004).
150 The debtor can compel the filing of a termination statement, or file one itself if the secured
party of record does not, if no secured debt is outstanding and there is no commitment to lend.
U.C.C. §§ 9-509(d)(2), 9-513.
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P. Privacy/Publicity of LOTL Information
A borrowing group might choose to direct the lien lord to maintain
its list ofsecured creditors in confidence. In such a case, the lien lord
only would disclose information to existing creditors appearing on the
list and to potential creditors identified by the debtor or borrowing
group. Such an information management structure mirrors the existing
rules under Article 9 pursuant to which a secured party appearing as a
matter of record in a financing statement is not required to provide
information to anyone who asks for it. Instead, the debtor must direct
the creditor to provide the information either to it for distribution to
others or to persons that the debtor identifies.
Alternately, a borrowing group might choose to direct the lien lord
to maintain its list of secured creditors in a publicly available manner.
One option for public companies might be to publish the list with its
quarterly or annual reports, with updates (if material) on Form 8-K.
Another option might be to maintain the list of secured creditors on a
website available to all. Such a web-based list would be updated in real
time as the list itself is updated; indeed, the original list might be
maintained in the hypertext markup language or html format used to
create web pages.
Recent economic research indicates that the level of disclosure
offered by a firm is positively correlated with lower interest rates
charged by the private debt markets-that is to say, more disclosure
translates into a lower interest rate spread. 151 This is true even for firms
that have outstanding public issues of debt for which a certain level of
disclosure already is mandated. This research supports earlier theories
to the effect that, in the absence of costs associated with providing
information, all firms would provide complete disclosure. To date,
because information about a debtor or borrowing group's secured credit
status is contained in a variety of places the information is expensive to
produce and to accurately update. Using a LOTL structure, however, a
one stop shopping source for accurate information is available.
Accordingly, a debtor or borrowing group might find it financially
beneficial to take advantage of the LOTL structure to provide more
151 See SUMON C. MAZUMDAR ET AL., To TELL OR NOT To TELL: THE VALUE OF
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE (Working Paper No. 36, Jan. 2002) (discussing credit spreads on
private debt, including bank loans), available at http://business.scu.edu/faculty/
research/workingpapers/pdf/sarin-apr02.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); cf FAN YU,
ACCOUNTING TRANSPARENCY AND THE TERM STRUCTURE OF CREDIT SPREADS (Social Science
Research Network Elec. Library, Working Paper, Nov. 28, 2003) (discussing credit spreads on
public debt), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID350040_
code021205670.pdf~abstractid=350040#PaperDownload (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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complete information about its secured credit status because such
disclosure might lead to lower interest charges on its debt instruments.
Indeed, a view that disclosure about details of financing arrangements
may benefit a firm might be behind a recent decision by a public
company to provide enhanced disclosure about compliance with
covenants in a bank credit facility.1 52
Q. A Simple Priority Structure
In simplest form, the lien lord agrees to act as representative for a
secured party upon the direction of the debtor following agreement with
the secured party that the new loan will be secured and will have
priority based on the date and time that the lien lord agrees to act for the
secured party. The agreement to act for the lender is evidenced by
entering the name of the lender and identification of the loan into a
ledger maintained by the lien lord. Section 9-322 of the UCC states that
security interests will have priority based on the earlier of the time of
filing or perfection. 153 There is no rule stated for the case in which
multiple secured parties rely on a single financing statement and
security agreement. It would seem that all the secured parties would
have equal priority in such a case. Nevertheless, section 9-339 contains
the remedy for this situation. 154 It states that "[t]his article does not
preclude subordination by agreement by a person entitled to priority."' 55
It is this section that is relied upon. When the lien lord agrees to act for
a lender, it obtains the agreement of the lender that the lender will have
priority based on the time that the lien lord agrees to act for it as
evidenced by entry of the lender and loan into the ledger. The simple
form of the LOTL structure is a pure first-in-time, first-in-right system.
R. Altering Traditional Priority Schemes
The direct transaction cost saving provides sufficient reason to
pursue the LOTL strategy. However, potentially more significant
benefits emerge from this approach. When multiple secured parties
simultaneously rely on the same documentation to perfect security
interests, opportunities exist to share cash flow and proceeds from asset
152 See Gretchen Morgenson, Why the Secrecy About Financial Covenants?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2003, at Cl (describing one company's disclosure of financial covenants in its periodic SEC
reporting and predicting other companies will follow).
153 See U.C.C. § 9-322.
154 See id. § 9-339.
155 Id.
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dispositions in proportions and priorities that differ from the results
required under the default rules provided by law for separately
documented transactions. Further, because the sharing of
documentation reduces the cost of obtaining preferred security status,
creditor classes that traditionally are unsecured may be given security,
so long as the debtor and its financial advisor determine that providing
such security would result in a preferred capital structure or business
model. Consider the following examples.
In addition to confronting documentation and information
production burdens, under our existing rules for secured credit
priorities, a second secured creditor faces several kinds of uncertainty.
First, the first secured creditor might inflate its lien by making
additional future advances. Piling more secured credit upon the priority
given to the first filed financing statement erodes the cushion provided
to the second secured creditor. Second, in a bankruptcy of the debtor,
the first secured creditor will be entitled to receive post-petition interest
to the extent of collateral value. This accumulation of post-petition
interest will erode the position of the second secured creditor in an
uncertain amount because the length of any future bankruptcy
proceeding of the debtor is unknown. The problem of post-petition
interest is a special case of lien inflation in action. 156
Using the LOTL structure, a borrowing group and its financial
advisor might determine that these default rules are not the most
efficient for its circumstances. The borrowing group can alter these
priorities within the intercreditor structure while at the same time
avoiding direct creditor-by-creditor bilateral negotiations by simply
implementing the structure that is deemed most desireable. This
approach is used all the time in securitization transactions in which
different priorities are assigned to different classes of principal and
interest. The financial engineers model for efficiency and then present
the structure to the market place. The difference is that, to date, this
approach is used for discrete pools of assets rather than for a debtor or a
borrowing group as a whole.
I have no particular private ordering of security interests to
recommend. Under the LOTL structure, the debtor, its financial advisor
and the marketplace will determine the preferred ordering system. 157
156 See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 BR. 528 (Bankr. S.DN.Y. 1991) (discussing
operation of post-petition interest in the context of shared security interest); see also In re
Southeast Banking Corp., 710 N.E.2d 1083 (N.Y. 1999) (stating rule of "explicitness" under New
York law for a senior creditor to obtain post-petition interest from a junior creditor). Any
intercreditor and subordination language must be explicit. See id.
157 See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 76, at 1180 (noting circumstances in which
the old transaction based system of priorities might be more efficient than the notice filing system
provided by Article 9 and how one might achieve a similar result by notation on particular
financing statements). The notion of flexibility advanced by Jackson and Kronman is expanded
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However, a few possibilities suggest themselves.
For example, to facilitate obtaining secured credit from second and
third priority creditors, the amount that a first creditor might advance on
a priority secured basis could be limited. Further, provision for post-
petition interest might be made out of a "fourth priority" pool after
payment of principal to first, second and third priority creditors.
Though similar results might be achieved on an ad hoc basis by bilateral
negotiation or covenant, the LOTL structure eliminates the bilateral
negotiation and the risk of breach. The modification of the current
treatment of post-petition interest reduces the risk that a second or third
creditor seeks relief from the automatic stay for erosion of its position in
a bankruptcy of the debtor.
Traditionally unsecured creditors might be granted collateral in a
vertical carve-out, pari passu with other secured creditors, or in a
horizontal carve-out, subordinated to senior creditor classes but
nevertheless senior to unsecured creditors. 158 A debtor might offer this
benefit to trade creditors to induce the extension of more credit, with
longer terms and lower interest charges, 15 9 or to employees if current
cash flow will not support higher current wage payments. A horizontal
carve-out might be offered to supplement unsecured priorities found in
§ 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. 160 Perhaps customers, such as those of a
grain elevator operator, would prefer to use a debtor that offered a
$10,000 secured priority to supplement the unsecured approximate
$4,650 priority created under current law.161
On a more speculative level, debtors or borrowing groups might
create horizontal or vertical priority for larger groups of unsecured
creditors without their consent. Receipt of a distribution from this
priority in bankruptcy, however, would be conditioned on a vote
supporting a bankruptcy reorganization plan approved by the debtor or,
by the LOTL strategy. The bilateral negotiations envisioned by Jackson and Kronman to contract
out of the Article 9 priority scheme, however, can be eliminated if a debtor and its financial
advisor develop an alternate scheme of priorities within which creditors must lend.
158 This suggestion amounts to a private implementation of the so-called "carve-out proposal"
pursuant to which a specified percentage of assets (e.g., twenty percent) would be exempt from
the secured creditor's security interest. The exempted assets would be available to satisfy the
claims of non-adjusting unsecured creditors. The carve-out proposal, initially advanced by
Elizabeth Warren, fueled a large, continuing academic debate over whether the institution of
secured credit itself is efficient. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The
Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to
Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997); see also Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1117 (2002).
159 Some studies show that trade creditors typically receive the second highest average priority
return in bankruptcy proceedings, just behind senior secured bank credit. See Debt Recoveries for
Corporate Bankruptcies, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., June 1999, available at
http://www.moodysknv.com/research/whitepaper/46119.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
160 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000).
161 See id. § 507(a)(5).
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perhaps, a senior class of creditor. 62 Though facially coercive, such a
structure would give these creditors a real stake in the enterprise, rather
than mere hold-up value. The prospect of losing this stake might result
in more rapid resolution of reorganization plans. This is particularly
true if the allocation provisionally granted to traditionally unsecured
creditors matched, as an empirical matter, distribution percentages
negotiated by similarly situated creditors in other bankruptcy
proceedings. In some sense, this type of priority structure might
function as the ultimate pre-packaged bankruptcy. Even senior classes
of creditors might support such carve-outs if they were convinced that
this structure reduced the risk of a long and drawn out bankruptcy
proceeding.
Use of privately created vertical carve-outs might blunt certain
criticisms of the current operation of our secured credit system,
discussed in Part IV below.
Lastly, as an innovative matter, a debtor might require the
recording of negative pledges and similar restrictions with the LOTL as
a condition to their effectiveness. Such a requirement would be
enforced by an amendment to the debtor's organizational documents
specifying that no such contractual restriction shall be effective unless
recorded in the LOTL ledger. Of course, such a restriction only would
be effective on a prospective basis. Over time, however, information
burdens associated with due diligence review of a debtor's contractual
restrictions would be reduced.
S. Enhancing Credibility with Investors
A borrowing group with an LOTL structure in place might elect to
grant all creditors of the borrowing group a security interest in all of its
assets. In general, such a security interest would benefit no creditors
because it benefits all creditors. However, the general rule is that a
162 Cases such as In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993) provide reason to
believe that the post-filing adjustments to secured claims needed to implement such a structure
would be upheld. Use of the LOTL structure also might provide valuation benefits for secured
creditors. Secured claims generally are determined using either liquidation value or going concern
value. Typically, courts use liquidation value in bankruptcy cases under Chapter 7, and going
concern value in reorganizations filed under Chapter 11. See David Gray Carlson, Secured
Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63, 76 (1991).
Using the going concern value can be problematic when trying to assign part of the value of the
business to a particular asset class and, therefore, may yield undesirable results. At least one case
suggests that a secured creditor should receive going concern value when its collateral consists of
all of the debtor's assets. In re Pullman Constr. Indus., 107 B.R. 909, 938 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1990). From this perspective, the blanket lien of the LOTL structure may provide greater
recovery for secured creditors by enhancing arguments that going concern value should be used
to calculate the amount of secured claims.
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security interest continues in property transferred by the debtor
notwithstanding the transfer. 163 A debtor might use this feature to
enhance its credibility in the marketplace.
A debtor might establish a structure such that any transfer of
property (or related series of transfers) above a specified dollar amount
to or for the benefit of an officer or director of the company would not
be transferred free of the lien unless the transfer and its dollar amount
had been specifically approved by a disinterested committee of the
board. Any transfer received in violation of the specified approval
procedures would trigger a prepayment event of outstanding
indebtedness, enforceable against the improperly transferred assets or
their proceeds. This repayment obligation might apply to indebtedness
that otherwise is unsecured.
Such a structure might offer several benefits. Officers and
directors should take a particular interest in seeing that any transfer of
company property either to them, or for their benefit, received full
disclosure and consideration by the proper committee of the board. The
incentive for full disclosure is the risk of transfer subject to the lien.
Second, in case of an improper transfer, creditors would have an extra
tool to make recoveries against officers and directors. Seeking a
recovery based upon a security interest may have advantages over
seeking a recovery based upon theories such as constructive trust or
fraudulent conveyance. All that is required for recovery is a tracing
rule; existing law already has developed rules, such as the lowest
intermediate balance test, that might be used for this purpose.
Ambiguity of the scope of application of the rule does not detract from
its in terrorem effect. Any buyer or other transferree of assets from a
debtor making such use of the LOTL structure similarly would have an
added incentive to make sure that any indirect benefits received by an
officer or director of the debtor were properly disclosed and approved.
The overarching benefit of this use of the LOTL structure would be
the signaling effect to the financial markets. A company that adopts
such a policy signals to the market that it is serious about following
procedures for managing conflicts of interest within the company. It is
hard to object to implementation of such a policy if the only price for
making significant property transfers free and clear of the security
interest simply is that a proper committee approve the transfer and the
amount. By covering transfers "to or for the benefit" of an officer or
director, transactions transferring assets to shell companies or
companies in which an officer or director held an interest would be
captured.
Investors understand the risk that managers may improperly
163 See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1).
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appropriate value from the firm, resulting in losses. Particularly in
today's market, saturated as it is with almost daily news reports of
managers running amok, 64 responsible managers should seek to
develop methods to assuage investors that they will not improperly
appropriate value. Even in light of legal reform, such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 65 comparative advantages should acrue to firms that can
provide credible assurance that their managers will not misuse firm
assets. Preferably, this assurance will not take the form of increased
direct monitoring costs by investors. Though not a perfect net, the
continuing lien does provide a mechanism by which investors might
recover improper transfers discovered after the fact, without resort to
ongoing monitoring.
III. OBSTACLES AND OBJECTIONS TO THE LOTL STRUCTURE
The LOTL structure's utility and feasibility can be further explored
by considering various obstacles and objections to it use. A variety of
these issues are discussed below.
A. The Major Meltdown
Objection: The creation of a single set of filings for all secured
creditors creates the risk of a massive failure of secured credit at a firm
if one or a small number of filings are improperly made or continued.
Response: Reliance on a single filing or a small number of filings
to perfect security interests in very large financings occurs all the time.
A common example is filings made in respect of accounts sold in
securitization transactions to special purpose vehicles. These
transactions may total in the tens of billions of dollars and rely on a
single UCC-1 financing statement. Similarly, a large syndicated loan
transaction may rely on a small number of filings. The risk of a mistake
is reduced in the LOTL structure in several ways, and the risk of
mistake can be reduced by a few additional procedures, if desired. First,
the LOTL structure can be used to regularize the timing for filing
continuation statements such that filings are confirmed or continued
each year during the three-month period prior to preparation of a firm's
annual audited financial statements. If a problem is found, the firm will
164 See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Guilty Verdicts Give Executives a New Focus: Risk of Prison,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at C5.
165 Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002"), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and other chapters (2002)).
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have another three-month period to correct the problem. If, despite this
regularization, further protection is desired, a second set of staggered
financing statements might be filed that offset the initial filings by a two
or three-year period. The maintenance of the backstop filings should
reduce to near zero the risk of a continuation failure. If a report on the
secured credit status of the LOTL structure were made part of the
regular financial reporting of a company, the company would publicly
signal its compliance with its private covenants to maintain and protect
the perfected status of its secured creditors. In theory, the company
should be performing this monitoring by virtue of its existing
contractual commitments. If the company takes monitoring these
covenants seriously, the LOTL structure actually would reduce costs.
B. Cost of Implementing the Structure
Objection: One might acknowledge the benefits of the LOTL
transaction infrastructure if it could be put in place with the snap of a
chief financial officer's fingers. At the same time, one might argue that
such a structure has not been implemented because corporate officers
have calculated that the cost of building the LOTL transaction
infrastructure exceeds the cost of building a secured guarantee web on a
transaction-by-transaction basis.
Response: I believe the reasons lie elsewhere. First, one needs to
understand how the LOTL structure might be created at minimal cost.
I see the LOTL system as being implemented over time in several
different ways. First, as any company acquires an asset, such as a
vehicle, that requires a special registration in order to perfect a security
interest, I would expect the company to plan ahead and, create the
policy that, upon acquisition of any asset requiring special notation or
registration of a security interest, note the lien lord on the title or in the
other registry. Also, as a matter of policy, whenever a company opens a
bank account or brokerage account, the lien lord would as a matter of
course be given "control" over the account in the original
documentation. Second, as any company closes a secured financing,
whether advertised as secured by "all its assets" or otherwise, I would
expect the company to require that the UCC-1 and other security filings
for that transaction be made in the name of the lien lord so that these
filings can be used both by the present transaction and in future
transactions. Third, even for companies that are not presently
contemplating a secured financing, I would expect them to consider
filing financing statements today in the name of the lien lord that will be
on record, and thus available to prime, other filings, for future secured
financings. Lastly, changes in law might be passed to make the
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implementation of an LOTL structure easier and more complete,
particularly by promoting the possibility of lien inflation and provision
for after-acquired property clauses.1 66
Particularly in the case of creeping implementation of the LOTL
structure, the added cost of creating the transaction infrastructure should
be modest. When the LOTL structure is implemented as part of a
secured transaction that is being documented anyway, the cost of using
the name of the lien lord on filings, rather than the name of the agent for
a loan syndicate, is truly minimal. The only real additional cost, other
than an educational one, is the creation of the special purpose entity to
act as lien lord. This should prove modest in relation to the potential
savings as the secured guarantee web can be used over and over
again. 167
The educational cost of the structure lies in the time and effort
spent by debtors to sell creditors on the idea of the lien lord. This cost
is more difficult to quantify. However, if the structure merely promotes
a "first in time, first in right" priority structure, there is nothing
particularly complex to explain to lenders that varies from the general
rule under existing law. If the agents for the syndicated loan can market
loan sales based on the comfort that the transaction is at least as fully
secured as a loan using a conventionally constructed secured guarantee
web, then I would expect little resistance based on increased cost. I
distinguish the educational costs associated with the basic LOTL
structure from the greater educational costs associated with creation of
alternate priority structures discussed in Part II above.
The question of why the structure has not been implemented
already is discussed below under "Why Now?" in Part III.
C. The Problem of Purchase Money Security Interests
Objection: Although the lien lord's financing statement will create
priority over most subsequent filings even if further financing
statements are filed, the UCC contains a significant exception to the
"first to file, first in right" principle. This exception applies to purchase
money financing transactions. A later filed financing statement used to
perfect a purchase money security interest, creates a prior security
166 An example of such a needed change is the case of federally registered copyrights. Current
law does not permit creditors to file generally against copyrights. Instead, a filing must be made
on a copyright-by-copyright basis. Recent proposed amendments to correct this problem did not
pass, allegedly due to lobbying efforts by large film studios who wanted to make it more difficult
for small, independent film companies to obtain financing. See supra notes 122-27 and
accompanying text.
167 See LoPucki, A Systems Analysis, supra note 75 (describing how technology makes use of
corporate forms increasingly inexpensive).
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interest in the acquired property. There is no way to police purchase
money secured creditors who wish to file in the UCC filing office rather
than with the lien lord. Thus, absent continuing multiple searches, the
ledger maintained by the lien lord will be incomplete.
Response: There are two responses to this concern. The first
response is that reasons have been advanced for why earlier secured
creditors should be unconcerned with the priority given to later secured
purchase money financiers. The assets of the debtor are not depleted
from the standpoint of the prior secured creditor because, in the absence
of the purchase money financing, the debtor would not have acquired
the asset. As the purchase money security interest is limited to the
acquired asset, the position of the prior secured creditor is never eroded
by purchase money financing or the priority given to it.
The second response is that the LOTL structure guards against
purchase money filing made with the UCC filing office rather than in
the lien lord ledger. As further protection for the structure, the lien lord
requires that the debtor give it the exclusive authority to file financing
statements. Although Revised Article 9 provides that the mere signing
of a security agreement constitutes authorization for the secured party to
file a financing statement, there is no express prohibition on the parties
modifying this statutory authorization by contract. The exclusive grant
of this right to the lien lord would be coupled with an interest based on
the advance of $1,000 by the lien lord to the debtor. A financing
statement filed by a person without authority is not effective. The fact
of this exclusive delegation of authority is stated in the lien lord's
financing statement itself to put subsequent creditors on notice. As a
practical matter, this notice may inhibit most creditors from trying to
opt out of the single financing statement regime imposed by LOTL even
if other parties make argument's that the exclusive delegation is
ineffective. If a debtor and its financial advisors believed purchase
money priority was an effective option to maintain, this possibility
might be included as part of its basic priority ordering as a supplement
to the simple first-in-time priority. In such a case, there would be no
incentive for the purchase money financier to file with the UCC filing
office rather than with the lien lord. In any case, subsequent filings with
the UCC filing office would result in a very public form of default,
which further polices the arrangement. 168
168 The criminal law may have a rolc to play here. For example, Iowa law makes it a crime to
transfer property in a manner that defeats a perfected security interest. See State v. Friedley, 2003
WL 1523343 (Iowa App. 2003).
The elements of theft of property with a security interest are: (1) defendant gave the
victim an instrument resulting in the victim having a security interest in property held
by the defendant; (2) the defendant owed the victim a balance under the terms of the
instrument; (3) the defendant destroyed, hid, took, or disposed of the property subject
to the security interest; and (4) the defendant did so with the specific intent to defraud
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D. The Problem of Judgment and Tax Liens
Objection: Many of the creditors using the LOTL structure will
come to the structure without funding commitments. In the absence of a
funding commitment, judgment liens may prime the security interest for
a new secured creditor advance notwithstanding an earlier UCC filing
by the lien lord. 169 Federal tax liens raise similar priority problems. 170
Thus, the potential new secured creditor will want to perform new UCC
searches in every case. Thus, one claimed efficiency for the structure is
illusory.
Response: The structural problem presented by possible judgment
and tax liens is a real problem that theoretically might increase the
number of UCC searches potential secured creditors want to perform.
However, a few factors mitigate the problem. Many lenders believe that
they will be made aware of significant judgment or tax liens through
other avenues, such as the financial press, a debtor's accountants or a
debtor's outside counsel. Further, the debtor itself typically has
reporting obligations for events such as the imposition of tax or
judgment liens, the debtor typically represents and warrants the absence
of such claims prior to funding a loan and the imposition of such claims
results in events of default under existing indebtedness. The imposition
of a judgment lien or a tax lien is an unusual and significant event for a
company with which the members of management making the
representations and warranties should be aware. Further, in current
practice creditors often rely on such alternate sources rather than
searches in any event. This is because such liens may not be revealed
by traditional UCC searches. 171 Judgment liens often appear docketed
the victim. IOWA CODE § 714.1(5).
Id. at *4. Debtors who do not follow specific procedures agreed with lenders may incur criminal
liability for transfers of property that defeat a structure for perfecting security interests. See also
18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (providing criminal penalties of up to one million dollars in fines and
thirty years in prison for knowing scheme to defraud financial institutions); 18 U.S.C. § 1014
(2000 & Supp. I 2001) (providing criminal penalties of up to one million dollars in fines and
thirty years in prison for providing knowingly false statements or reports or overvaluation of
collateral security in loan applications).
169 See U.C.C. § 9-323(b).
170 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6323(c), (d) (2000).
171 Where a tax lien is filed is a matter of state law. See id § 6323(0. Many states have
adopted The Uniform Federal Lien Registration Act, published in 1978, to bring some order to
filings. 7A UNIF. L. ANN., BUS. & FIN. L. 449 (1999). Even if a federal tax lien is required to be
filed in the UCC filing office, some concern over the form of the filing exists. In In the Matter of
Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co., 302 B.R. 351 (E.D. Mich. 2003), the district court
overturned a bankruptcy court ruling that held a federal tax lien filing did not need to comply as
to form with the UCC filing rules even though it was required to be indexed in the UCC filing
office. The specific question was whether the tax lien filing had to use the debtor's exact legal
name as required by the UCC or instead might use another formulation if permitted by federal
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in court records, rather than UCC filing offices, and there is some
concern over whether tax liens must strictly comply with UCC filing
requirements so that they would be uncovered by a conventional UCC
search. Secured creditors do not, as a matter of practice, make all the
searches needed to uncover the extent of these claims. The LOTL
structure does not aggravate this problem.
E. The Additional Involvement ofAccountants
Objection: Debtors and borrowing groups will object to the
additional oversight of accountants and increased reporting that is
sprinkled throughout the description of the LOTL structure.
Response: Corporate executives may not like the additional
reporting and scrutiny. However, such additional monitoring may make
good business sense. Historically, companies did not publicly report on
the status of their compliance with covenants in loan agreements.
Recently, however, we have seen that tradition being broken. 172
Companies should recognize that the credibility of their executives is at
a low point. Even absent outright fraud, investors will tire of executive
claims of ignorance about details of financial arrangements. 73  A
borrower's accountants are in the best position to report on the integrity
of the borrowing group by virtue of their preparation of consolidating
financial statements. Also, accountants are in the best situation to
confirm the status of bank accounts and security accounts. When
balance sheets are prepared, the accountants similarly are in the best
position to determine which advances purport to be purchase money
financings. A borrower can signal to the loan market that it is serious
about procedures to perfect and maintain security interests if it adopts a
strategy, such as the LOTL strategy, that enhances credibility of
representations, warranties and covenants made by debtors.
F. Overreaching by Creditors
Objection: The LOTL structure will make it easier for creditors to
demand more collateral than they need. Debtors will not have the
excuse of transaction costs to avoid overbroad creation of security
law. The bankruptcy court found that federal law controlled so that the UCC filing rules did not
need to be followed in this respect. The district court reversed.
172 See Morgenson, supra note 152 (describing one company's disclosure of financial
covenants in its periodic SEC reporting and predicting other companies will follow).
173 See Jeffrey L. Seglin, When Executives Say They Don't Have a Clue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2003, C4.
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interests at the insistence of predatory creditors.
Response: This concern is misplaced for the large and sophisticated
debtors and borrowing groups who would implement the LOTL
structure. There is evidence that these borrowers can take care of
themselves in negotiations. In an analogous situation, concern was
expressed that banks would pressure borrowers to commit to use
investment banking services as a condition to obtaining credit
extensions-an illegal tying of credit to other services. The Department
of Justice recently stated that there was little reason to worry about such
pressures.
Syndicated lending is a national market with a substantial number of
bank and non-bank competitors. Further, borrowers in this market
are large corporations with well-trained and sophisticated staff fully
capable of negotiating favorable terms. The syndicated loan market
is the largest capital market in the world, with over $1 trillion of
annual volume. We see no evidence that large borrowers such as
syndicated loan borrowers need additional assistance beyond the
antitrust laws to protect themselves from anti-competitive tying.
Such firms are much less likely to be victims of anti-competitive ties
than small business customers or individual consumers, and were not
the customers that were intended to be protected by section 106.
Consequently, if the Board determines that section 106 must remain
broader that the antitrust laws, the section's reach should be limited
to those small businesses and consumers that were the original focus
of the legislation.174
G. Creating a System of Secret Liens
Objection: The LOTL structure turns the concept of notice filing
on its head by, in effect, making the nature and extent of secured credit
at any debtor or borrowing group secret. The LOTL structure makes
further inquiry beyond a search of the UCC records by potential secured
creditors a virtual certainty whereas, with the existing system, in which
each creditor files its own financing statement, many potential inquiries
are avoided because the public records disclose the only information
needed by a potential secured creditor to make a lending decision.
Response: The type of notice envisioned by the current UCC filing
system is one of inquiry notice. The publicity envisioned is not
publication of information useful to the capital markets generally or
needed by individual secured lenders to make credit decisions. Rather,
the notice merely indicates that a possible priority claim to debtor assets
174 See Department of Justice Comment Letter (Nov. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/201459.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
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exists and identifies a reliable third party (other than the debtor or its
affiliates) from whom a potential creditor might inquire for further
information. Such a notice system inhibits lying by a debtor about the
status of priority claims to its assets. What the LOTL structure does is
merely separate the identification of the reliable third party information
source who will speak the truth about secured credit transactions from
the implementation of particular transactions. Though, in current
practice, the truth teller often is designated on a transaction by
transaction basis, there is no need for this connection and, indeed, often
the connection proves inefficient. Let us compare and contrast some
efficient and inefficient situations.
The situation in which the information received from the UCC
search results proves most efficient is one in which the searcher does
not feel the need to make further inquiries from additional secured
parties disclosed by the search. No further inquiry is needed either if
the search results disclose no extent financing statements or if the search
results disclose only financing statements with collateral descriptions
limited to collateral in which the secured party has no great interest.
The latter situation often exists if the potential new secured party
represents a loan syndicate that requires a lien on all assets of the debtor
and the extent financing statements all contain limited, specific
collateral descriptions that suggest ordinary course isolated purchase
money financing transactions for office equipment and similar smaller
cost items. In all cases with broad collateral descriptions further inquiry
may be prudent.
The current amendments to Article 9 make the situation of the
narrowly crafted financing statement that eliminates the need for further
inquiry merely fortuitous. A prudent secured lender will reduce its ex
ante cost of preparing financing statements by using a broad "all assets"
description to reduce the risk of transcription error created by
reproducing a narrow granting clause description in the financing
statement. The debtor does not have a structural way to police use of an
overbroad description because its signature no longer is required to
appear on the financing statement. The debtor might negotiate with the
secured party for its agreement to use only a narrow description but,
other than concern over client relationships, it is difficult to see how
such a covenant might be practically enforced. The mere signing of the
security agreement gives the secured party authority to file initial
financing statements with whatever collateral descriptions it choses.
The amendments to Article 9 confirm that the point of financing
statement disclosure is to identify a reliable third party to tell the truth
about the status of the debtor's secured financings and not to reveal
useful information about individual secured financings. The UCC does
not require the financing statement to disclose such important matters
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as: (i) whether the secured party's security agreement contains a future
advance clause or covers after-acquired property, (ii) the maturity of the
secured debt, (ii) the interest rate and other payment terms of the
secured debt, (iii) whether the secured debt contains provision for
revolving credit advances, and (iv) the stated maturity date of the
secured debt.
Particularly in the case of a borrowing group, the LOTL structure
may prove more efficient for a potential secured party because the
secured party must make one inquiry from the lien lord, rather than
commissioning multiple searches against various debtor names in
multiple jurisdictions. If the debtor or borrowing group is serious about
maintaining a record that is useful to future secured parties, it can
structure the ledger maintained by the lien lord to contain additional
information that potential secured parties may find useful. The debtor
has control over the structure of the lien lord's ledger to a greater degree
than it can control the public filing system. It might even use the lien
lord as a record depository to compensate for its own inadequate
recordkeeping practices. It is a common experience to perform a UCC
search and, on the basis of the search, to request further documentary
information from the debtor. Often, the debtor is unable to produce
underlying financing documents or to link particular financing
statements with particular transactions. Such information management
problems at a debtor would be eliminated if the lien lord maintained an
electronic copy of the underlying security agreement and related
financing documents for the secured parties that it indexed in its ledger.
H. Why Now?
Objection: If the LOTL structure truly provided the benefits
suggested, the market would have recognized its virtues and developed
it already. The absence of the structure indicates possible inefficiences
not noted in the development of the proposal outlined above.
Response: There are three responses to this objection. The first is
that, to a limited extent, aspects of the structure have been with us for a
long time. As developments in the lending markets evolve to further
reduce bilateral contracting in lending arrangements, the mature LOTL
structure should develop. The second is that, until recent amendments
to the UCC became effective, the legal certainty for the structure that
make its full implementation possible did not exist. In the absence of
this certainty, the market did not want to try something new. The third
is that, at a theoretical level, the legal academy has failed to appreciate
the flexibility that security interests provide as an asset partitioning
device in contrast to the benefits of using legal entities to partition
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assets. Let us consider the third response in more detail.
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman have suggested that one way
to understand the existence of firms is by focusing on the ability of
firms to facilitate "asset partitioning" (the "H&K thesis"). 175 The H&K
thesis identifies firms as superior asset partitioning devices over other
legal forms, including security interests. They label security interests as
inferior asset partitioning devices for a variety of reasons, including the
inability of security interests to accommodate floating secured parties
and the need to reflect the names and addresses of secured parties in
financing agreements. 176 Unfortunately, as a technical legal matter, the
H&K thesis is wrong in its characterization of the limited flexibility of
security interests. This mischaracterization has two bad side effects.
First, it may blind transaction cost engineers to the full potential of
security interests as a structuring tool. Second, it prevents the H&K
thesis from pursuing a little more deeply the implications of an
extremely valuable way of looking at the problem that Professors
Hansmann and Kraakman have developed. The possibility of the LOTL
structure hopefully will cause a reexamination and further development
of the H&K thesis.
The H&K thesis is led astray by a misuse of the Fretz case, 177 in
which the judge carelessly stated the problem presented as one of
"floating secured parties." The Fretz court claims that floating secured
parties are not possible. This type of observation also may have led
practitioners astray. The facts of Fretz are far different from the court's
rhetoric.
In Fretz, a secured party held an oversecured claim against a
bankrupt debtor. The security agreement that created the security
interest contained a "dragnet" clause stating that the security interest
secured not only all existing debt held by the secured party but also all
other debts of the bankrupt, whenever acquired by the secured party.
After the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the secured party purchased
unsecured claims from other creditors of the bankrupt. The secured
party argued that these unsecured claims were transformed into secured
claims by virtue of the purchase and operation of the dragnet clause.
The court's ruling was correct, but for reasons not stated in the opinion.
The court's holding prevented the post-filing conversion of unsecured
claims into secured claims. The character of a claim is determined as of
the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The secured creditor in
175 See Organizational Law, supra note 8.
176 Id. at 417-19.
177 In the Matter of Fretz, 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally Flechtner, Inflatable
Liens, supra note 111, at 714-15 (discussing Fretz). Inflatable Liens fails to note that the key
problem in Fretz was the post-petition change in the status of unsecured claims into secured
claims; see also Steven Walt, The Case For Laundered Security Interests, 63 TENN. L. REv. 369
(1996).
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Fretz attempted an end run around this timing principle.
As a contract law matter, if the secured creditor had purchased the
unsecured claims prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the
claims would have become secured claims in the bankruptcy. In fact,
floating secured parties would have existed. The pre-petition protection
against such behavior is provided by another source. If the purchase of
the unsecured claims had occurred within ninety days of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, the creation of the security interest to secure
previously unsecured antecedent debt would have been avoidable as a
preference under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. 178  Post-petition
protection against such a conversion is provided by the fact that the
status of claims is determined as of the filing date.
Beyond Fretz's unfortunate language, floating secured parties exist
all the time in commercial finance transactionib. In any secured bond
financing, the trustee typically acts as collateral agent for the
bondholders who come and go as bonds are traded. A secured party
today will not be a secured party tomorrow if the investor sells the
bonds. Similarly, an agent bank for a secured syndicated loan typically
acts as collateral agent for the syndicate. The identities of the secured
lenders change as the members of the syndicate buy and sell loans.
Again, floating secured parties are simply part of the secured lending
landscape.
An additional possible reason accounting for why the H&K thesis
misses this point is the date of the article advancing the thesis. Though
the practice had been to use floating secured parties in the distant past of
secured financing, for example by railroads using nominees such as
trustees and collateral agents to act for the bondholders and other
lenders, the practice only recently was expressly sanctioned by Article
9, with its express adoption of the concept of a "representative" of
secured parties, conforming express positive law to existing practice. 179
Once one sees that these alleged differences between firms and
security interests do not exist, then one is free to examine some other
possible explanations for the use of firms and to develop security
interest practices towards more efficient structures.
I. Transaction Costs as Friends?
The LOTL approach might receive opposition from three different
sources, each of which views transaction costs as friends. First, the
supporters of grand proposals (discussed in Part IV below) who see
178 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000).
179 See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra.
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secured credit as globally inefficient will oppose implementation of
such a program. 180 More secured credit, and more comprehensive
secured credit, leaves fewer assets and asset classes for the unsecured
creditors to feed upon when bankruptcy strikes. Second, some theories
argue that inefficiencies created by perfection hierarchies actually might
be efficient because they force creditors only to take as collateral those
assets on which they really intend to rely.18' That is to say, the added
costs of complying with certain procedures prevents creditors from
being greedy when it comes to the scope of collateral coverage. Third,
some debtors may find it convenient to use transaction costs as an
excuse to provide a loan syndicate with a smaller collateral package
than is ideal from the perspective of the syndicate.
None of these objections should prevail over the LOTL structure.
As discussed below in Part IV, implementation of the LOTL structure
presents the opportunity for debtors and creditors to create alternate
priority structures that at least partially address the concerns of grand
proposal supporters. As the grand proposals were completely defeated
(or, perhaps, ignored) in the last round of amendments to Article 9, the
supporters of the grand proposals might be prepared to advocate a
different approach to solving the problems they have identified.
Though I believe creditors often are greedy and borrowers often are
spineless, I do not believe that transaction costs are the cure. As
discussed above, debtors should be able to protect themselves,
nothwithstanding the convience of transaction costs as an excuse to
reject a greedy creditor's demand. Rather, the possibility of creating
alternate priority structures will create the financial incentive for debtors
to resist overreaching and also may create incentives for creditors.
Indeed, creditors who also act as financial advisors to borrowers may be
in the vanguard of promoting alternate priority structures just as they
have, in the past, promoted securitization programs for their debtor and
borrowing group clients, Alternate priority structures typically involve
giving special carve-outs and priorities in designated asset classes to
targeted investor groups. To work, the alternate priority structure
cannot operate with a pure first in time, first in right philosophy and will
not work if debtors needlessly have granted excess collateral to the first
lender to provide financing. As a common example, a securitization
program is nothing but a large scale carve-out of whole asset classes for
the benefit of the securitization lenders at the expense of general lenders
180 Opponents can be expected to include Professors Elizabeth M. Warren, Lucian Ayre
Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried. See supra note 158; infra note 183; see also G. Ray Warner, The
Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 3 (2001)
(criticizing recent amendments to Article 9 as giving too much away to secured creditors).
181 Preferring one method of perfection over another method of perfection creates a
"perfection hierarchy." See Picker, supra note 11, at 1158 (suggesting that perfection hierarchies
may be efficient in matching creditors to collateral on which they are relying).
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to the borrowing group that generates the assets subject to the
securitization. Lending groups routinely either permit securitization
transactions as a carve-out to their own security interests or later grant
consent for debtors to implement them. Agent banks find it to their
advantage to work with debtors and borrowing groups to maximize
financing opportunities.
IV. GRAND PROPOSALS AND TECHNICAL PROPOSALS
Suggestions to amend Article 9 fall into two camps. In the first
camp are proposals to change the substantive law of priorities or make
other sweeping changes ("grand proposals"). By and large, these
suggestions have been unsuccessful. In the second camp are proposals
that have, as their general aim, the reduction of very specific transaction
costs ("technical proposals"). These suggestions have been far more
successful. The former, unsuccessful suggestions tend to be motivated
by a big picture insight into some large systemic inefficiency in the
secured credit system. The latter, successful suggestions are less grand,
and take aim at making some single step in the secured credit process
easier to accomplish.
The grand proposals further subdivide into two types. The first
type of grand proposal starts with the insight that individual contracting
among parties often can be a significant transaction cost. To reduce
these types of transaction costs, the strategy is, through logical
argument and empirical observation, to identify the priority structure
that would appeal to most creditors and debtors.' 82 If the law then
enacts this priority structure, the aggregate amount of contracting
activity will be reduced as most parties accept the priority structure that
the law has drafted for them. In the minority of cases where the default
priority structure will not suffice, the parties incur transaction costs to
alter the priorities.
The second type of grand proposal starts with the idea that the
contracting process itself, in the milieu of secured credit transactions,
produces an inefficient result. 8 3 This inefficient result obtains even if
182 See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 211 (1989).
183 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (providing a model in which secured
credit functions to permit transactions that transfer costs to non-adjusting creditors, resulting in
net negative utility); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of
Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) (arguing that secured credit is inefficient); Alan
Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2073 (1994) (explaining how
subsequent secured financing reduces the value of pre-existing unsecured claims more than
subsequent unsecured financing); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions,
41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1067 (1989) (explaining how secured credit harms non-adjusting creditors,
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(and, perhaps, particularly if) the direct transaction costs of creating
secured credit can be reduced or eliminated. On this view, big picture
inefficiencies are created by secured credit transactions because
contracting parties ("insiders") export costs on those who are unable to
make contracts within the secured credit system ("outsiders").
Outsiders may be unable to make contracts within the secured credit
system because: (i) they are involuntary creditors, (ii) they lack
bargaining power, or (iii) transaction costs for those creditors are too
high to make bargaining for protection a viable option. Though the
direct transaction costs incurred to implement a secured loan may be
reduced by implementing technical proposals, thus creating apparent
local efficiencies, the very institution of secured credit operates to create
system wide global inefficiency. The theory that the institution of
secured credit creates global inefficiency has been hotly debated, with
numerous arguments made by academics defending the institution of
secured credit as efficient. 184
The technical proposals interact with the grand proposals in the
following ways. First, as the technical proposals make steps in the
secured credit process less costly to implement, the difference between
effecting a secured transaction using the default rules and creating a
custom tailored contract solution diminish. In the limiting case, where
the cost of constructing an alternative to the default rule approaches
zero, the choice of the default rule does not matter. In the real world in
which transaction costs cannot be eliminated entirely, the urgency of
drafting the "correct" default rule is diminished, though the value of the
project is not eliminated. The LOTL structure adds an additional
insight. It is important to draft rules in a manner that facilitates
modification of the default rules at lowest cost. This allows the market
to adjust most easily if the legislators and their advisors either get the
default rule wrong or if technology evolves such that what once was an
efficient default rule no longer holds that exalted status. Allowing the
use of nominee secured parties such as a lien lord greatly facilitates
drafting around laws that may prove inefficient.
Second, the implementation of the technical proposals apparently
conflicts with grand proposals that see secured credit as inefficient.
such as tort claimants).
184 See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REv. 2179
(1994); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994) (noting that many
debtors who incur secured debt do not have the option of incurring unsecured debt); Claire A.
Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1117 (2002) (providing empirical research
suggesting that secured creditors do not intentionally transfer undue risks to non-adjusting
creditors); Jackson & Kronman, supra note 76 (suggesting that unsecured creditors compensate
for increase risk posed by security interests by charging higher interest rates); Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425
(1997) (providing a model in which secured credit is efficient).
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This is so because the technical proposals, by reducing the cost of
implementing secured credit, make secured credit more prevalent and
more comprehensive as it becomes easier to encumber more asset
classes owned by debtors. This enhanced coverage for secured insiders
reduces assets available to repay the unsecured outsiders, further
encouraging the exporting of costs onto the outsiders.
This conflict, however, may be only partial. It all depends on why
the unsecured creditors are outsiders. As suggested in Part II above, 85
the LOTL structure might be used to bring certain traditionally outside
creditors under the secured creditor umbrella in a locally cost effective
manner. If debtors and their financial advisors elected to do so,
aggregate efficiency might be enhanced, rather than reduced, by
technical proposals. This is true, even from a big picture perspective, if
the technical proposals led to a broader class of creditor being able to
take advantage of the protections offered by secured credit.
One reason why technical proposals have been implemented may
be that consensus can be reached on whether a specific rule change that
targets a step in the secured credit process promotes efficiency in a
narrow sense. 186 If steps are eliminated, and the process simplified,
local transactional efficiency has been enhanced. One reason why the
grand proposals have not been implemented may be that often there is
no consensus on whether altering a priority scheme will create a more
or less efficient secured credit system. 87  The lack of consensus
prevents the formation of a majority block needed to enact a sweeping
grand proposal.
The technical proposals and the creation of transaction
infrastructure have a common denominator: promotion of efficiency by
the reduction in steps. The recent amendments to Article 9 took three
giant steps forward in this direction with (i) the specification of a single
location for filing a financing statement against most debtors, 88 (ii) the
185 See supra notes at 158-62 and accompanying text.
186 An example of such a proposal is the reduction in the number of applicable filing offices.
See supra note 75.
187 One significant reason for the lack of consensus may be the lack of empirical data on the
distribution of transaction opportunities that are globally efficient and the distribution of
transaction opportunities that are globally inefficient. Models may be constructed in which
secured credit promotes completion of inefficient transactions and models may be constructed in
which the lack or constriction of secured credit results in efficient transactions not being pursued.
In the absence of information on the distribution of good and bad transactions in the marketplace,
it is difficult to draw system wide conclusions.
188 The benefits of a single filing office is not a phenomenon unique to the UCC or to secured
lending practice. For example, on November 2, 2002, President Bush signed legislation to
implement the Madrid Protocol for trademarks. The Madrid Protocol will permit United States
trademark owners with an international trademark portfolio to facilitate multiple country
registration of trademarks in a single application as opposed to using individual filings in foreign
jurisdictions. See World Intellectual Property Website, at www.wipo.int/madrid (last visited Feb.
27, 2004). A single application is filed in a single office with filing fees paid in a single currency
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elimination of the signature requirement for UCC-1 financing
statements, 89 and (iii) the ability to use a generic description of
collateral on a financing statement. 90 It is easy to underestimate the
importance implementation of these paradigmatic technical proposals
will have on the secured transaction process. Indeed, if debtors were
organized as single legal entities (i.e., if borrowing groups did not
exist), it is reasonable to believe that we would see increased
satisfaction with the secured credit system rather than the rise of
insurance products for secured transactions.Certain of the procedures followed in the creation of a secured
credit transaction can be represented by branching tree diagrams in
which each node represents an information source that must be
consulted.' 9' The evolution of Article 9 can be seen, in part, as an
attempt to collapse multiple branches into single branches, thus
eliminating information sources (i.e., nodes in the diagrams) that must
be consulted by creditors making secured loans. On the definition of
"efficiency" used in this article, the elimination of steps creates a more
efficient secured credit structure and, thus, should be promoted.
The technique of collapsing multiple information branches into a
single branch is best illustrated by the recent amendments to Article 9
that specified a single debtor location for filing a financing statement,
replacing a system in which filings against a single debtor might be
required in multiple jurisdictions. Examining the diagrams reveals a
structural similarity between the steps that formerly needed to be taken
with respect to a single debtor before the Article 9 revision and the steps
that currently need to be taken with respect to a single borrowing group
composed of multiple individual debtors. Though the UCC has reduced
multiple information sources to a single source in the case of the solo
debtor, multiple information sources still must be consulted (i) in the
case of borrowing groups and (ii) to evaluate the status of collateral in
certain asset classes. Part of the LOTL strategy is to isolate multiple
branch structures in the tree diagrams (for both individual debtors and
borrowing groups) and consider how they too may be collapsed
(preferably with minimal amendments to the UCC). The use of the lien
lord as a nominee is the primary mechanism through which multiple
information sources are collected into a single source, thus eliminating
transaction steps. 192
to obtain protection in over seventy countries. Changes of address and renewal fees similarly are
streamlined.
189 The deletion of the signature requirement was intended primarily to facilitate electronic
filing of financing statements. Nevertheless, the elimination of this requirement dramatically
eased the process of closing secured transactions for borrowing groups.
190 See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
191 See Appendix infra text accompanying notes 203-05.
192 The process is not unlike construction of connected graphs in graph theory in which the
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V. ASSET PARTITIONING REVISITED
The foregoing analysis will have been successful if it results in a
re-examination of the usefulness of security interests as asset
partitioning devices and how that usefulness might be enhanced through
development of business practices and changes in law. The legal
structures used to create artificial legal entities, such as corporations, do
not differ in form as dramatically from the legal structures used to
create security interests as might first appear. However, these
similarities of structural form have been obscured because legal actors
have tended to use legal entities to create relatively permanent
transaction infrastructure for business organizations whereas legal
actors have tended to use security interests to create custom structures
on a transaction by transaction basis for particular financings.
Debtors and borrowing groups can use both legal entities and
security interests to organize the property interests of a group of
investors under a single nominee name in a relatively permanent
manner that facilitates trading of asset positions without further need to
comply with property law procedures that require additional notice to
third parties. The use of a legal entity, rather than a security interest,
has some advantages in that it can provide protection against application
of the automatic stay in bankruptcy. 193 However, use of a security
interest, rather than a legal entity, can provide protection against veil
piercing laws that impose liability regardless of the insertion of a legal
entity between the actor generating the liability and the assets in the
separate legal entity. 194 Within a business organization consisting of
multiple legal entities, the most secure asset partition often requires use
of both a separate legal entity and a security interest so that the impact
of both the automatic stay and veil piercing laws may be avoided.
The case study of the evolution of syndicated lending reveals a
connected graph with the fewest edges uses a single point to link all other points in the structure.
See, e.g., GARY CHARTRAND, INTRODUCTION TO GRAPH THEORY (1977).
193 See 11 U.S.C. § 362. Even this partition will not be effective for this purpose if used to
partition assets within a borrowing group without further procedures. The parent company in the
borrowing group has the power to file, or to direct the filing of, voluntary bankruptcy petitions on
behalf of its subsidiaries. The automatic stay may thus apply to subsidiary assets even though
partitioned by use of a legal entity. To avoid this risk, secured creditors need to supplement the
use of the legal entity with special bankruptcy remote governance procedures in which the
subsidiary's ability to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy is neutered. Generally, this takes the
form of appointing independent directors sympathetic to the secured parties who will not vote to
file a bankruptcy petition and amending the charter of the subsidiary to require the vote of all
directors as a pre-condition to a bankruptcy filing. Generally, such an arrangement is thought to
be workable because it does not constitute a mere contractual prohibition on filing for bankruptcy,
which would be void as against public policy.
194 See BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 20.
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trend towards reduction of transaction costs in capital raising activities
by shifting away from bilateral contracting to raise funds towards
inclusion of multiple financiers in a single contract structure.
Increasingly, this structure is designed to accomodate various changes
in business needs, thus -prolonging the life of the contract structure.
Prolonging the life of the contract structure further minimizes
contracting costs. The creative use of contracting techniques in the
syndicated lending arena reveals how transaction cost engineers may
reduce many inefficiences inherent in raising capital from multiple
financing sources. However, we also have seen how the continued
development of these cost-reducing practices confront obstacles when
security interests form part of the financing package. The obstacles to
cost reduction result when asset partitioning within a debtor or
borrowing group form part of the capital raising strategy.
The obstacles arise because, as a practical matter, asset partitioning
that allocates collateral for priority claims to a subset of firm creditors
requires compliance with property law procedures in addition to use of
contracting procedures. 195 The development of syndicated lending to
date reflects problem solving that focuses on problems which have
solutions achievable by contracting alone. The LOTL structure expands
the universe of cost reduction techniques by working with property
based rules.
The contrast between the streamlined process of raising capital in
an unsecured syndicated loan with the much more complex process of
raising secured financing reflects a comparative complexity for secured
financing that lawyers, acting as transaction cost engineers, have not
addressed sufficiently to suit current business requirements. The time
compression achieved for unsecured financing can only be matched in
the secured financing arena by compressing the time frame in which the
necessary property law tasks must be completed. Such hurried
procedures, performed on a transaction-by-transaction basis, increase
the chance of error and create dissatisfaction with the process in both
lawyers and businesspeople. This is why we see the market trend of
participants turning to alternate sources, such as insurance companies,
for confirmation that assets have been partitioned successfully, or we
find market participants simply throwing up their hands.
The asset partitioning obstacles may be addressed for a variety of
asset types with varying degrees of success, but only by supplementing
195 The use of multiple bilateral contracting among existing creditors to create subordination
agreements, though a theoretical option using pure contract, does not offer efficiencies. Such
procedures introduce a new set of bilateral negotiations into contracting practices that have made
strides to eliminate bilateral contracting. Further, they are not binding on future voluntary
creditors or on involuntary creditors, resulting in both the need for ongoing bilateral contracting
and reduced certainty for the asset partition. See U.C.C. § 9-339 (noting that parties must agree to
subordination).
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contract law techniques with property law procedures. Effecting
transaction cost reduction in the area of secured credit requires a shift in
thinking that treats the creation of property law partitions involved in
taking collateral on a systemic or programmatic basis, rather than on a
transaction by transaction basis. In effect, it requires that transaction
cost engineers think about security interests as they currently think
about legal entities.
The separation of a necessary property law task from execution of
an individual contract transaction is not a revolutionary step. This is
precisely the move made in the securities trading business as the direct
transfer of ownership of paper security certificates between brokerage
firms was replaced by the indirect holding system for securities, in
which security transfers are reflected on the books and records of a
reliable securities intermediary. The inefficient ceremony of property
transfer that required the physical delivery of paper certificates by
brokers to settle transactions at each day's end was replaced with a
nominee system in which a reliable third party, such as The Depositary
Trust Company, holds jumbo certificates that represent large positions
in stocks and bonds. The truth of ownership of these securities are
simply reflected on the nominee's books and records in simple book
entries. The analogy to the indirect holding system for financial assets
and its possible application to Article 9 of the UCC was made in 1994
by the Reporters to Revised Article 9 when they suggested
implementation of a private filing system option for security interests. 196
Unfortunately, this suggestion was not pursued.
What the foregoing analysis demonstrates is that the private filing
system option continues to have merit, even if the public filing office
difficulties that prompted its initial suggestion by the Reporters have
largely been addressed. The LOTL strategy does not merely perform an
end run around state filing offices to solve problem-, of administrative
backlog but actually contributes to transaction cost reduction in other
meaningful ways. One benefit will be to promote greater certainty for
the status of secured financings, particularly in circumstances of time
pressure to complete a financing. This greater certainty might assist
insurance companies in writing coverage for secured transactions and
lawyers in rendering legal opinions. To the extent that ascertaining the
secured status of a particular debtor's or borrowing group's obligations
can be reduced to essentially an accounting function, the need for
insurance policies and legal opinions might be reduced or eliminated. 97
196 See Private Information Market, supra note 80.
197 Indeed, the foregoing analysis suggests that the most efficient system might allow
perfection of security interests merely by notation in a debtor's or borrowing group's financial
statements. This was a path considered, but not taken, early in the Article 9 drafting process. 1
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 15.1, at 463-64 (1965)
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What we find is a conflict of sorts between the existing ceremonies
required to create generally enforceable security interests in property
and the most efficient contracting techniques employed to raise capital.
What emerges from an examination of the conflict are the parameters of
the types of property based rules that minimize the conflict, permitting
the maximum contracting flexibility to partition assets among various
financing sources. Generally, these preferred property rule parameters
are: (i) the express ability to indicate security interests in public records
and other financing documents by use of a nominee name or designation
of a representative of secured parties, (ii) the absence of a limitation
requiring a specified amount of obligations to be registered as a
condition to recording a security interest, coupled with express
protection for future advances dating back to the date of the original
security interest filing, (iii) the ability to describe the property subject to
the security interest in a generic manner in the property records, with
express coverage for after-acquired property, rather than rules that
require object specific identification of particular assets, and (iv) the
absence of rules that impose payment of taxes on the amount of
financing secured as a condition to creating a security interest. 198 An
additional beneficial law change would be the elimination of the
requirement to periodically continue financing statements that expressly
provide that the secured party is a representative or nominee. Currently,
financing statements expire after five years if not continued with a new
filing. 199
The best solution to promote asset partitioning by contract would
be for legal rules to be amended to provide a single filing source for
recordation of all security interests, regardless of asset type. Indeed,
such a simplifying move motivated the replacement of multiple filing
systems for security interests in personal property with the unified
system reflected in current Article 9.100 Though this simplifying move
was made, much to the benefit of secured financing, the UCC system
never was comprehensive. As the economy has evolved, assets
(noting an argument against the public filing system is that bankers rely on financial statements,
not public records, in making credit decisions). For a critique of this approach, see David Morris
Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing Under Article 9 (pt. 1), 59 B.U. L. REV. 1,
39-40 (1979). Professor Alces makes a similar critique by performing an analysis of the UCC
filing system based on two different models that he labels: the informational, bulletin board
model and the claim-staking model. Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filings System, 79
MINN. L. REv. 679, 680 (1995).
198 1 am not arguing against raising revenue from such transactions. I am arguing against
linking the raising of revenue to the compliance with the property law rules needed to create
effective security interests and mortgages. A more efficient rule would raise revenue through
documentary stamp taxes on secured notes. Failure to pay the tax on the secured note would
render the obligation unenforceable.
199 See U.C.C. § 9-515.
200 See generally 1 GILMORE, supra note 197, § 9.1 (discussing simplification of legal regimes
as a motivating factor behind Article 9 of the UCC).
1648 [Vol. 25:5
2004] SECURED SYNDICATED LENDING 1649
excluded from UCC coverage, such as certain items of intellectual
property and regulatory property, have become increasing significant as
items of collateral. The significance of our current system of multiple
recording systems for property interests, and its inefficiencies, are
placed in stark relief by the financing trends away from bilateral
contracting towards syndicated financing in which financiers must work
with multiple systems to create blanket liens for syndicated credits. The
weakness of the system was not exposed when financiers extended
credit in smaller, bilateral facilities in which less collateral coverage
was required so that the financier needed only to work with a single
property recording system to perfect an interest in collateral for a
particular transaction.
Being realistic, however, the secured financing nirvana created by
a single filing system for all assets of a debtor or borrowing group is an
aspirational goal to be realized, if at all, in the distant future. However,
to the extent existing property recording regimes reflect the parameters
identified above, private parties can create transaction infrastructure that
will mimick the benefits promised by the aspirational target of a single
recording system. The parameters also provide guidance for
incremental law reform. Those systems that currently do not conform
to the identified parameters might be amended to accomodate the LOTL
strategy.20t The guiding principle is to structure our property rules in a
201 The proposals made in this article have broad applicability. For example, The
Organization of American States (OAS) formulated principles to be followed in formulating laws
governing secured transactions. See Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Permanent
Council of the Organization of American States, Comparison of the Two Working Documents on
Secured Transactions Based on the Legal Principle of a Secured Financing System (Nov. 8,
2000). These stated principles do not mention the importance of allowing nominees to act for
secured creditors. Id. Following these stated principles, the OAS subsequently promulgated a
model act providing for secured transactions. See Model Inter-American Law on Secured
Transactions, CIPID-VI/Res. 5/02 (approved Feb. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.oas.org/dil/CIDIP-VI-securedtransactionsEng.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
Though not specifically enunciated as a principle, the model act does appear to provide for the
use of nominees by secured parties. See id at Tit. I, Art. 3, III. It is expected that the OAS and
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) will coordinate the
future development of recommendations on the private law relating to secured transactions. See
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States Resolution, Follow-up Activities on the Model Inter-American Law on Secured
Transactions and the Uniform Bills of Lading for the International Carriage of Goods by Road
(May 8, 2003), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/CIDlP-VlIIres. 1922.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2004). The ongoing joint efforts would do well to make explicit the importance of allowing
nominees to act for secured creditors. Similarly, mention should be made of how passage of
misguided taxes and filing fees can defeat efforts to enhance efficient credit structures.
Consideration might be given both in the United States and abroad to extending the effectiveness
of financing statements indefinitely (i.e. not requiring filing of continuation statements),
particularly in the case of secured parties who are identified as acting in a nominee capacity. For
a description of the UNIDROIT efforts on recent private law reform, see Sandeep Gopalan,
Securing Mobile Assets: The Cape Town Convention and its Aircraft Protocol, 29 N.C. J. INT'L &
COM. REG. 59 (2003); Charles W. Mooney, The Cape Town Convention: A New Era For Aircraft
Financing, 18 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (2003).
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manner calculated to promote, to the greatest extent possible, the
freedom of contract to partition assets while at the same time preserving
the promotion of goals which have structured our property rules in the
first instance.20 2
202 These goals traditionally have been inhibiting lying and stealing by debtors. See supra
note 76. Promotion of only one of these property based goals typically is sufficient to confer
property status on the claims of a secured creditor to the collateral posted by a debtor.
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APPENDIX
Diagram 1, Pre-revision Article 9 structure:
LocationFiling
Office Creditor ./ Name
Diagram 2, Revised Article 9 structure:20 3
t /
_Filing -
D ice
203 Enhances efficiency by replacing multiple filing locations with a single location so that
searches are made in a single location.
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Diagram 3, LOTL structure: 204
/17
Diagram 4, Consolidated Group Borrower:20 5
S-Filing [. Ne r - --
204 Enhances efficiency further by replacing inquiries of multiple creditors with inquiries made
to a single source.
205 Each subsidiary corresponds to a unique location given revisions to Article 9. An
expansion of the diagram might insert a "location" node between "Subsidiary" and "Filing
Office" in a one-to-one relationship.
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Diagram 5, Group Borrower using LOTL:
Subidr Filing
\~ub, ffce Craedito°r m
Office 
Creditor
mCreditor7
roup 1 F~~~~liffnge~ Nam 
] - ---" Ceeo /-2'-

